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.when one maintains a trace of childhood within

him • • . He seems to take part in the restitution of the
power of abolished dreams."
The Poetics of Reverie.

Gaston Bachelard (1971).

Boston, Massachusetts:

Beacon

Press, pp. 133-134.

"To find an event in memory, it is necessary to construct
a plausible scenario for that event's occurrence, thus
using essentially the same mechanisms necessary to
understand the original event.

Retrieval is therefore

a process of re-understanding the experience • • • • "
(Reisser, Black, & Kalamarides, 1985 in press, p. 2;
emphasis in original)

"There are no indifferent or nonsensical recollections •
• • • We remember those events whose recollection is
important for a specific underlying psychic tendency ••
Every memory is dominated by a goal-idea which directs
the personality-as-a-whole."
Ansbacher, 1947/1979, p. 6)

(A. Adler, quoted by

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The present study examines the influence of emotional "states"
upon the content and recollection of very old autobiographical memories, more specifically of early childhood memories (EMs).
questions are the major focus of the research.

Two

First, does the

current emotional state of the rememberer bias retrieval processes
toward memories with emotional content similar to or CQD.gruent with
the rememberer's emotional state?

This mood biasing influence has

been referred to by Bower (1981) as mood-dependent retrieval (MDR)
because there is evidence that emotions can act as powerful retrieval
cues for mood-congruent memories.

And, second, do emotions encoded

in EMs show any type of patterning or organization such as that
found in the naturalistic expression of emotional "states" (Diener

& Emmons, 1985; Plutchik, 1980).

More precisely, will the circumplex

pattern between emotions identified by Plutchik (1980) in the naturalistic expression of emotions also be found in the patterning between
emotions encoded in memories of early childhood?
At a theoretical level the current study has two goals.

The

first is to contribute data relevant to understanding the manner in
which the contents of a person's autobiographical memory can be
thematically related (McAdams, 1985) to the emotional aspects of
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personality and motivational processes.

The second is to demonstrate

that models of the relationship between cognition, emotion, and
memory (Bower & Cohen, 1982; Clarke & Fiske, 1982; Clark, Milberg, &
Ross, 1983; Izard, Kagan, & Zajonc, 1984) can be further refined by
considering qualities of the naturalistic expression of emotional
states (Diener & Emmons, 1985; Izard, 1972, 1977; Plutchik, 1980;
Polivy, 1981).
The literature pertinent to the present study is organized as
follows.

Research and theory on the psychological significance of

EMs will be briefly reviewed.

It will become apparent that further

insight into the memory processes mediating thematic continuity is
needed.

One avenue toward such insight may be found through what is

known of emotional influences upon memory.

Evidence that emotions

do influence memory processes will be discussed, and Bower and
Cohen's (1982) model of such influences will be considered.

Research

inconsistent with it is analyzed and attributed to methodological
failures to control for the intensity, similarity, and polarity
parameters of emotional states.

Plutchik's (1980) circumplex model

incorporating these dimensions of emotions will then be presented
and used to formulate several hypotheses about the emotional content
and recollection of EMs.

A study testing these hypotheses is pre-

sented and discussed.
Current Perspectives on Early Childhood Memories
Many psychologists (Manaster & Corsini, 1982; Mayman, 1968;
Olson, 1979) consider EMs to be the simplest and most effective
method available for the "projective" assessment of personality and

3

motivational processes.

The contrasting theoretical viewpoints of

Freud (1901/1965) and Adler (1956, 1969) have guided the projective
use of EMs.

While Freud believed that the content of EMs was often

"screened" or altered by later defensive processes, Adler argued
that EM content was a transparent reflection of the goals, motivations, and life-style of the rememberer.

What unites these theorists

is their common belief that EM content could be analyzed to reveal
significant information about the development, personality, and
motivations of the individual.
There is, indeed, evidence to support the thematic relatedness
of EM content to various descriptive features of the personality and
motivational processes of the rememberer (Olson, 1979).

Three

studies are described below.
Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) evaluated Freud's (1901/1965)
hypothesis that "screen memories" (the characteristics of which are
described in the Methods section of the current report) reflect conflict and anxieties originating during the "Oedipal period" of
psychosexual development.

They found indirect support for this

argument in that such memories were significantly correlated with
current anxiety and defensiveness as assessed by psychometrically
refined personality assessment devices.
Clear and direct support for Adler's perspective can be found
in the studies of Lord (1971) and McAdams (1982).

Lord (1971) found

that positivity-negativity of affect, and activity-passivity as a
mode of problem resolution in EM content was significantly correlated
with similar themes in the thematic content of various other projective
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and non-projective assessment methods (e.g., the Rorschach, Thematic
Apperception Test, Draw-a-Person Technique, and interviews regarding
vocational goals).

McAdams (1982) demonstrated a similar type of

thematic relatedness between power and intimacy motivation and more
recent, rather than "early," autobiographical recollections.

He

found that themes of power and intimacy in Thematic Apperception Test
protocols and in the content of recent particularly positive, or "peak
experience" memories were significantly correlated.

Lord (1971) pro-

vided data on the reliability of thematic coding and McAdams (1982)provided both reliability and validity information for his scoring system.
These demonstrations of the thematic relatedness of EM content
to the rememberer's emotional state, motivational processes, and
personality style lend credence to the use of autobiographical
recollections such as EMs for assessment purposes (Olson, 1979).
However, demonstrations of correlations between EM content and the
characteristics of the rememberer require rather than provide further
understanding of the underlying processes of memory mediating such
relationships (Kihlstrom, 1981).

On the basis of their own study

Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) make the following appraisal:
A major problem for studies of personality and memory is
to explicate the relations between what is accessible in an
individual's autobiographical memory, the way in which these
memories are retrieved and reconstructed in the specific
instance, and other features of personality. (p. 145)
There are, therefore, two issues faced by investigators
attempting to pursue the relation between personality and memory
as identified by these authors.

The first involves identifying

the relation between personality and memory;

and the
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second is explaining the relationship.

There appear to be at least

two ways in which personality may be related to and influence
memory.

Each has consequences for the second issue of providing a

plausible account of the mechanisms involved.

The first assumes

that personality may ultimately be "translated into strategic cognitive activity" (Shower & Cantor, 1985, p. 276).

This links person-

ality and memory by assuming they are both a type of cognitive
process.

This approach at least partially addresses the second

issue since "personality" (as strategic cognition) and memory can
then be discussed in the same language, e.g., of information-processing.

This notion has met wide acceptance (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1981;

Clarke & Fiske, 1982; Fiske & Taylor, 1981; Hamilton, 1983; Izard,
KaEan, & Zajonc, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1985; Mancuso & Ceely, 1980;
Markus, 1980).

Critics, however, wonder whether there might not be

certain "unique features" (Greenwald, 1981) to personality that are
overlooked in this theoretically reductive translation (Pervin, 1984,
1985; Tomkins, 1979).
A second way to conceptualize the relation between personality
and memory gives to each equal status as independent but temporally
interactive psychological systems (Lewis, Sullivan, & Michalson,
1984; Royce & Powell, 1984).

A difficulty for this approach has

been identifying the processes through which they interact.
A possible resolution to this quandry may have been anticipated by Schachtel (1947, 1959) in his theoretical analysis of the
apparent "amnesia" most individuals
before the age of four or five years.

have for memories of events much
Drawing upon Bartlett's. (1932)
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theory of memory, Schachtel argued that the cognitive "schemata" of
the child and adult are too dissimilar for the adult's schemas to act
as effective retrieval cues for childhood memories.

An interesting

feature of Schachtel's theory was the manner in which adult-child
differences were conceptualized.

The developmental change influencing

memory was the relative extent to which emotions suffused and shaped
experiences.

The adult's cognitive processes are more strongly con-

ventionalized and schematic because they are shaped by language and
socialization.

Whereas, Schachtel argues, the child's perception and

thought are shaped more by emotional and sensory processes.

The

final step in the argument was the assumption that EM content was
saturated by such emotional and sensory content.

Since the adult's

thought processes showed less of this content they could no longer
function as effective retrieval cues for the memories.

1

Schachtel's (1947) account of childhood "amnesia" depends upon
a principle of memory functioning called the "encoding specificity
principle" (Tulving, 1983).

This principle of memory retrieval

states that "what is stored is determined by what is perceived and how
it is encoded, and what is stored determines what cues are effective
in providing access to what is stored" (Tulving & Thomson, 1973, p.
353).

There is extensive empirical support for the validity of this

model of memory retrieval (Houston, 1984; Spear, 1978; Tulving, 1983,

1

The validity of Schachtel's psychoanalytic account of developmental changes is not the issue here. Recently, White and Pillemer
(1979) have used Piagetian theory to make the same essential argument
but attribute the key developmental changes to alterations in cognitive structures.
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1984).

The interesting suggestion made by Schachtel (1947, 1959) is

that temporal and developmental fluctuation in the manifestation of
emotional-motivational processes in thought content may influence the
accessibility and retrievability of EMs.
Recent evidence that emotions may serve as powerful and influential encoding and retrieval contexts for memories (Bower, 1981, 1983;
Gilligan & Bower, 1984) makes Schachtel's (1947) argument all the
more intriguing in light of the two perspectives on the relation of
personality and memory discussed earlier.

Viewing emotions as one

of the "other features of personality" alluded to by Kihlstrom and
Harackiewicz

(1982) makes one wonder whether there might not be cer-

tain "unique features" (Greenwald, 1981) of emotions which influence
memory but cannot be reduced to or explained by cognitive processes.
Early childhood recollections have consistently been shown in
survey studies to have strong and predominant emotional content
(Dudycha & Dudycha, 1933, 1941; Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982;
Walfogel, 1948; Wynne & Schaffzin, 1965).

In addition, three recent

theoretical discussions focusing on various aspects of childhood
memories have asserted that strongly emotional EMs are the ones most
likely to show thematic relatedness to the personality of the rememberer (Epstein, 1983; McAdams, 1985; Tompkins, 1979).

Therefore, one

might speculate that the accessibility and retrievability of EMs may
be particularly vulnerable to interference as a result of fluctuations
in emotional states.

Evidence for emotional influences on memory

will therefore be considered.
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Emotional Influences Upon Memory
The structures and processes of memory have assumed an increaingly important role in theories of human cognition over the last
decade (Rumelhart & Norman, 1983).

Many researchers now accept the

following propositions about the structure of memories (Tulving &
Bower, 1974):
a) memory representations of individual events can be studied
and described;
b) memories are usefully conceptualized as collections of more
elementary components or features;
c) these features or components differ in some sense qualitatively;
d) they are at least to some extent independently manipulable
and variable; and
e) the extent to. which a particular feature is represented
in a memory trace can be quantitatively assessed.
Equally recognized is the fact that one's assumptions about memory
representations cannot be logically separated from assumptions about
memory processes, the two equally constrain one another (Anderson,
1978).
A powerful method for assessing the contents of memories involves
retrieval cueing (Tulving & Bower, 1974).

Based on the encoding

specificity principle (Tulving, 1983), the method involves testing
memory for the same class of events using different retrieval cues.
If it is assumed that the effectiveness of cues is a function of their
"match" or inherent similarity with the features encoded in a memory,

9
then the relative effectiveness of different cues serves to identify
the features of a memory.

In this way both the structure (i.e.,

features or components) and the process (i.e., the encoding specificity principle) of memory can be examined.
A logical consequence of this framework for examining memory has
been the recognition that various features of the "psychological
state" of the individual, in addition to the putatively "to-beremembered" material, are encoded into memory representations of
events.

One of the more intriguing aspects of this process is illus-

trated by occasions when.it appears that the individual's "state"
takes precedence over the "to-be-remembered" material as effective
retrieval cues for memories.

Such occasions are termed instances of

"state-dependent" memory, and alcohol and drugs are known to produce
such effects (Eich, 1980).
Recently, Bower (1981, 1983; Gilligan & Bower, 1984) has reviewed an extensive series of investigations he has conducted demonstrating that emotions can act as distinctive encoding and retrieval
contexts for memories.

He calls this "mood-dependent retrieval" (MDR)

because it appears to be quite analogous to the phenomena of drug
and alcohol "state-dependent" memory.
One of the first studies showing that an individual in a happy
or sad mood better remembers material learned while in the congruent
mood is described in Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1978).

Moods were

manipulated in this study through the use of hypnotic induction.

Each

subject learned two different word lists and then was asked to recall
both lists in a third and final session.

Mood was manipulated at

10

three times:

while learning list 1, list 2, and at recall.

Six

different groups were formed by crossing the two moods of happiness
(H) and sadness (S) with the three stages of the study, i.e., H-H-H,
H-S-H, H-S-S, S-H-S, S-S-S, and S-H-H.

Two types of matching of

moods across conditions therefore occurred.

The mood "controls" who

learned and recalled the lists in the same mood (H-H-H and S-S-S),
and the groups who learned and recalled one of the lists in the same
mood (H-S-H, H-S-S, S-H-S, and S-H-H).

Memory or retention was scored

as the percentage of items recalled from the original learning trials
that were retrieved on the last recall test.
cut and highly synnnetric.

The results were clear

Figure 1 shows these results.

Subjects

learning and recalling a list in the same mood (either happy or sad)
demonstrated the highest retention.

Subjects in the same mood (either

happy or sad) across all three sessions (the "mood controls") demonstrated an intermediate level of retention.

Subjects who learned

and recalled a list in different moods (either happy then sad or sad
then happy) demonstrated the poorest retention.

Thus, an emotional

state appears to have either facilitated or interferred with recall
depending upon whether learning and recall occurred under similar or
different moods.
The experiment just described involved a learning task in which
the emotional state of the subject was manipulated at both initial
encoding and later retrieval.

As such it provides the necessary

degree of experimental control to warrant the conclusion that something about the emotional state of the subject influenced the accessibility of the learned materials.

The possibility that the hypnotic

11

80

learn
sad

learn
happy

70

%

Retention

60

Mood
Controls
50

40
Happy

Sad
Recall Mood

Percent retention depending on the match between learning
and recall moods. The sloping lines refer to subjects
who learned the two lists under different moods.

Figure 1.*

The "Symmetric" Mood-Dependent-Recall Effect

*This figure is from Bower (1981, p. 132, Figure 2)
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procedures somehow influenced the results does not appear likely since
this two-list learning study has subsequently been replicated with
similar (though not ~xactly the same) results by Bartlett and Santrock (1979) using children and a mood manipulation involving the
reading of happy and sad stories.

This experiment and the follow-up

in Bartlett, Burleson, and Santrock (1982) will be discussed in
greater detail subsequently when findings of asymmetric MDR effects
will be considered.
In addition to word-lists, Bower (1981) reports the accessibility of recent autobiographical memories can be influenced by
MDR.

Subjects were given diaries in which to record their signifi-

cant emotional experiences for one week.

They were asked to describe

the incident and rate its emotional intensity as soon as possible
after the event occurred.

At the end of the recording week the

14 subjects turned in their diaries and returned one week later for
testing.

At this time they were placed in either a happy or a sad

mood and were asked to recall all of the incidents they had recorded.
MDR was observed:

Subjects who were happy at recall retrieved pro-

portionately more of their happy incidents (94%) than did subjects
who were sad (46%).

The MDR effect, however, was "asymmetrical" in

that the sad subjects did not recall a larger proportion of sad than
happy memories.

Happy subjects on average recalled 25.1 happy and

1.5 unhappy incidents while sad subjects recalled 8.6 happy incidents
and 10 unhappy incidents.

Thus, in addition to MDR, a difference in

the effectiveness of memory functioning was observed across the mood
conditions.

Happy subjects recalled a larger total number of memories
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than did the sad subjects (27 versus 18.6).
Having subjects rate the affective quality of a life-incident
at the time of diary recording may have confounded the judgment of
affective quality with the emotional tone of the experience itself as
the factor producing the observed MDR effect.

In other words, it may

have been the affective judgment that "matched" the mood of the subject at recall.

To rule out this possibility another study was con-

ducted (Bower, 1981, Experiment 3).

In this study subjects were

asked to recall autobiographical incidents occurring before "entering
high school" (subjects were college students).

The assumption

underlying this study was that subjects have a store of both happy
and sad autobiographical memories.

If MDR operates then one would

predict that memories with affective qualities congruent with mood at
recall would be better remembered than memories with dissimilar
affective qualities.
The design of the study involved the use of post-hypnotic
suggestions (Hilgard, 1965) to the effect that the subjects would
enter either a happy or sad mood when "cued" by the investigator.

Out

of trance subjects were asked to recall incidents before high school
and it was emphasized that as many unrelated incidents as possible
were to be recalled.

Subjects wrote brief "telegraphic" single-line

phrases describing the incidents on a sheet of "green paper" that was
the post-hypnotic cue for some subjects to feel sad and others happy.
Ten minutes were allowed for recall.

The post-hypnotic suggestion

was then removed and subjects were asked to return the next day.
this time subjects, who were presumably in a more "neutral" mood

At

14

state, rated the affective quality of each incident as either happy,
neutral or sad.

These ratings were used to look for the MDR effect.

An analysis of variance on the number of happy versus sad memories
showed that happy subjects recalled far more happy memories and sad
subjects recalled slightly more sad memories.
happy plus sad memories was also analyzed.

The ratio of happy to

The proportion of happy

memories would be 50% if no selective mood biasing was present.

Happy

subjects had a "happy proportion" of 96% while sad subjects had a
"happy proportion" of 46% which is a statistically significant difference between the groups.

The MDR effect was again asymmetric in

that the sad subjects did not show a higher proportion of sad (i.e.,
sad to happy plus sad) memories than did the happy subjects.
A final study described in Bower (1981) provides what is
probably the most impressive evidence of MDR currently available.
It is also the most complex of the studies reported.

The basic

premise underlying MDR is that moods or affective states can act as
distinctive encoding and retrieval contexts that either facilitate or
interfere with memory when they are congruent or incongruent.

To

determine whether multiple emotions rather than just happy and sad
emotions influence memory, the following study was conducted.

The

issue was whether four emotions could produce different degrees of
MDR effect depending upon their degree of similarity to one another.
Using Plutchik's (1980) analysis of basic emotions, Bower selected
the emotions of joy, sadness, anger, and fear.

According to Plutchik

(1980) these emotions differ in their degree of polarity (or oppositeness) and similarity to one another.

Joy is the polar opposite- of
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fear.

These polar sets of emotions are orthogonal to one another in

Plutchik's (1980) structural or "circumplex" model of emotions.
Figure 2 displays Plutchik's (1980) circumplex model of eight basic
emotions illustrating their similarity and polarity relationships.
The main prediction of Bower's (1981) study was that a recall
mood similar to a learning mood would result in greater accessibility
or recall.

To test this subjects were asked to learn a different

word list in each of the four emotions and then to recall each list
while either in the same emotional state (in which it was learned), a
different but not opposite emotional state, or the opposite emotional
state.

The results were that emotional similarity (as indexed by

Plutchik's model) affected recall.

When learning and recall emotions

matched, retention averaged (i.e., across all four emotion matches)
85%;

when the emotions were different but not opposite, 70% of the

words on a list were recalled;

but when learning and recall emotional

states were opposite, retention averaged only 54%.

The results are

so orderly that they confirm not only Bower's MDR predictions but also
lend support to Plutchik's (1980) similarity scaling solution for the
emotions (Bower, 1981).

This point will be discussed more fully later

when Plutchik's model is considered in detail.
The results of the four studies conducted by Bower indicate that
emotions can selectively bias the recall of affectively toned memories.
It should also be noted that these studies comprise only a small proportion of the research he has conducted to determine the influence
of emotional states upon cognitive processes in general.

These other

influences are not the primary concern of the present study.

For the
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Plutchik's Circumplex Model of Emotions*

*Adapted from Plutchik (1980, Figure 11.2, page 160).
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sake of comprehensiveness, however, it can be noted that, in addition
to MDR, Bower has found evidence that 1) mood states enhance the
learning of mood congruent material, 2) the intensity of a mood
affects learning differently depending on the particular mood and
materials used, and 3) emotional states can bias cognitive processes
such as interpretations, fantasies, projections, free associations,
personal forecasts, and social judgments.

Research supporting these

assertions is reviewed in Bower (1981, 1983; Bower & Cohen, 1982;
Gilligan & Bower, 1984).
Bower's Theory of Mood-Dependent Recall
Before turning to other studies finding MDR effects it will be
useful to consider Bower's (1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982) semantic network theory of affect and memory processes.

This theory models

memory for an event in terms of an associative network of descriptive
propositions and concepts.

Network theories (e.g., Anderson & Bower,

1973; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Collins & Quillian, 1969; Rumelhart &
Norman, 1983) conceptualize memory as an associative network of nodes
representing among other things concepts, schemata, and events.
Bower (1981) proposed that emotions might be considered as nodes or
units in such a network with each emotion node having strong associative links to other units in the network (Figure 3).

An event becomes

encoded in the network as a series of propositions with powerful
associative links to concepts and other units (such as "emotion
nodes") and schemata to which they are related.

The propositions in

an associative network can refer to words, autobiographical experiences, stories, or any other type of material encoded into memory.
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Figure 3.a

The Associative-Network Connections Which Can
Be Used to Explain Mood-Dependent Retrieval
The subject has studied many adjective-noun
phrases (also called Subjects and Predicates,
e.g., Dying Dog, Lost Money, etc.) in Context
1 while feeling Emotion 1.

aThis figure is from Gilligan & Bower (1984), p. 556, Figure 18.3.
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These propositions are conceived as "the basic units of thought, and
the activation of them or their related concepts is the basic process
of thought" (Gilligan & Bower, 1984, p. 556).
to occur either directly or indirectly.

Activation is assumed

Direct activation occurs

by the presentation of a corresponding stimulus pattern;

for example,

stimulation of an emotion would activate the corresponding emotion
node;

or, to give another example, presentation of a word would

activate a corresponding lexical item encoded in the associative
network.

Indirect activation occurs when "energy" spreads (Collins

& Loftus, 1975) from associated nodes that are activated;

for

example, the lexical item node could be activated by "energy spreading"
to it from an associated ("linked") emotion node.
The MDR results can be explained using the concepts of "spreading activation" and an associative network through the use of one
additional assumption.

Specifically, when material (of any kind) is

encoded into the "network," emotions present at the time are also
"tagged" into the same portion of the associative network.

For

example, in the list learning study presented earlier, one assumes
the following.

When a word is presented to the subject and encoded

into memory, the emotional state at the time is also encoded along
with the word.

Facilitative MDR effects at recall are explained by

assuming that congruent moods provide indirect activation for the node
representing the word.

Inhibitory MDR effects are explained on the

assumption that the incongruent emotion node sends indirect activation to portions of the network representing material other than the
"to-be-remembered" material.

This causes "interference" for the
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decision and control processes that many models of memory assume are
involved in the act of recall (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Lindsay & Norman, 1977; Wickelgren, 1979).
An interesting aspect of this account of MDR is its ability to
explain a previously puzzling feature of state-dependent memory (SDM)
effects in general (Eich, 1980) such as those created by drugs and
alcohol.

Eich's (1980) review of this literature revealed that the

many inconsistencies in finding SDM could be resolved when the specific memory tasks used to assess SDM were considered.

He shows that

the likelihood of finding positive evidence for SDM increases to the
extent that memory is tested by recall rather than recognition
methods.

The associative network theory of MDR accounts for this

difference using the concepts of direct and indirect activation.
Consider for a moment the differences between a recall and recognition test.

A recognition test is conducted by presenting the subject

with the "to-be-remembered" item and inquiring whether it had or had
not been presented in the learning trial.

In this test, presentation

of the "to-be-remembered" item provides direct activation for the
portion of the associative network encoding the memory through the
presentation of its corresponding stimulus pattern (i.e., a word,
nonsense syllable, etc.).

A SDM recognition test may therefore

"override" any influence of the mismatch between learning and memory
test "states" by providing the subject with a retrieval cue that acts
as a direct source of activation for the memory.
By contrast an SDM recall test constitutes a much more severe
test of memory.

The recall task does not provide subjects with
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specific cues (or "direct activation") with which to retrieve the
memory.

In such tests the subject is asked simply to remember what

had been presented earlier.

Under this set of circumstances the

subject must "self-generate" (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) cues with which to retrieve the memory.

These self-

generated cues are by definition sources of indirect activation for
the associative network since they do not contain the exact stimulus
pattern which is encoded in it.

Thus, in a SDM (or an MDR) recall

test when the subject's current "state" (either emotional or drug/
alcohol induced) matches "features" encoded into the memory, it provides a source of direct activation for the memory and can facilitate
retrieval.

A "mismatch" between encoding and retrieval "states"

degrades memory performance in a similar way by activating the wrong
portions of the network which thus interferes with successful recall.
A final bit of evidence with which to evaluate this account is
provided in Gilligan and Bower (1984).

This study tested whether MDR

would be differentially observed using recognition and recall tasks.
Using hypnotic induction of happy and angry emotional states, the
subject viewed pictures of faces first in one and then the other mood.
Following an interval, subjects were given one recognition test in
one of the moods and then another recognition test in the other mood.
Each recognition test included "distractor" pictures not previously
shown, some pictures learned in the happy mood, and some learned in
the angry mood.

This 2 x 2 design ensured that pictures seen in

congruent and incongruent moods were viewed in each recognition test
thus testing for MDR effects.

The results were negative.

No MPR
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effects could be observed in either recognition test.

Thus, Eich's

(1980) generalization that SDM effects occur in recall but not recognition tests generalizes to emotional "states" and indicates that MDR
is a similar type of phenomenon.
A Review of Mood-Dependent Recall Studies
Table 1 lists the results of 24 experiments on MDR.

This table

includes the 6 independent studies reported by Bower (Bower et al.,
1978; 1981).

Table 1 classifies studies by the type of mood-induction

procedure used (with the exception of two studies which more precisely
"categorized" subject by diagnostic category), the specific moods or
emotions studied, and the degree of MDR observed (none, asymmetric,
symmetric).
Before hypnotic and non-hypnotic studies can be discussed as a
group it is necessary to determine whether these different methods of
manipulating moods affect the results of studies.

Of the 18 studies

not conducted by Bower, 17 did not use hypnosis to alter moods.
Furthermore, of these 17 studies, 12 (70.6%) found some degree of MDR
(i.e., either symmetric or asymmetric).

Of the 7 studies which did

utilize hypnosis, 5 or 71.4% found some degree of MDR.

Therefore, one

can conclude that hypnosis is not necessary for MDR to occur and that
it does not appear to produce a larger proportion of MDR effects across
studies than does a non-hypnotic method of mood manipulation.
Subjects.

The 24 studies used a variety of subject groups.

Bartlett and Santrock (1979) studied a group of young children with
a mean age of 10 years while Bartlett et al. (1982) studied two groups
of children with mean ages of 4 and 7 years.

Both studies found

Table 1
Twenty-four Mood-Dependent-Recall (MDR) Studies Classified by Induction Method, Mood(s) Studied,
and Degree of MDR Found (None, Asymmetric, Symmetric)

INDUCTION METHOD

Mood(s)

Symmetric

Asymmetric

No MDR

Naturalistica
Bartlett & Santrock (1979)b
Bartlett et al. (1982)b,l
Clark et a. (1983)c,m
Isen et al. (1978)d,n

x
x

H-S
H-S
(R-E)r

x
x

H-S

Macht et al. (1977)c,o

x

Experiment 1

F-NF

Experiment 2

F-NF

x

Experiment 3

F-NF

(X)u

Experiment 1

H-S

Experiment 2

H-S

x
x

Nasby & Yando (1982)f

N

w

Table 1 (continued)

INDUCTION METHOD

Mood(s)

Symmetric

Asymmetric

No MDR

Velten Techniqueg
Leight & Ellis (1981)
Experiment 2g

x

S-N

Synder & White (1982)g
Experiment 1

H-S

Experiment 2

H-S

Teasdale & Russell (1983)h

H-S

Teasdale & Taylor (1981)g

H-S

Teasdale et al. (1978)g

H-S

x
x
x
x
x

Hx:pnosisi
Bower, Monteiro,& Gilligan (1978)i
Experiment 1

H-S

Experiment 2

H-S

Experiment 3
Bower (198l)i,p

H-S

Experiment 2
Experiment 3q
Experiment 4
Natale & Hantas (1982)i,s

x
x
x
x
x

H-S
H-S
H-S,F-A
H-S

x
x

N
~

Table 1 (continued)

INDUCTION METHOD

Mood(s)

Symmetric

Clark & Teasdale (1982)j

D-D

Henry et al. (1973)k

M-D

x
x

Asymmetric

No MDR

Pathological States

NOTES. aThe specific methods for each study in this group are:
breading happy and sad stories;
Cphysical exercise;
dsuccess/failure at a computer game;
emild electric shock;
frecalling recent happy and sad autobiographical experiences;
gdescribed fully in Velten (1968), basically an autosuggestive procedure in which subject reads a series
of statements printed on index cards that described emotionally-toned attitudes, feelings, behaviors,etc.;
hused a modified form of Velten's (1968) technique but deleted all references to what might be construed
by subjects as personal experiences referring to autobiographical events;
ithe hypnotic induction procedures were standardized insofar as the hypnotist made suggestions about the
specific feelings the subject was to experience; however, the subject was encouraged to remember autobiographical experiences similar to what was suggested and was encouraged to "re-experience" the effect
that occurred in the past personal experience;
jthe subjects were clinically diagnosed unipolar depressives showing diurnal variation in intensity of
depression;
kthe subjects were diagnosed bipolar affective disorders with episodes of depression and mania ("euphoria");
lthe results of Experiment 1 were discarded by the authors due to a procedural error identified through
Experiment 2 (which is included in this table);
N
V1

Table 1 (continued)

mExperiment 1 only; 2 and 3 were on "arousal-selective" judgment not memory per se;
nExperiment 2 is tablulated; Experiment 1 studied mood effects on social behavior;
oauthors report sex differences. Males displayed synnnetric MDR across all three studies; females
showed asynnnetric MDR only in Experiments 1 and 2. The group results are tabulated;
PExperiment 1 in Bower (1981) is summarized from Bower et al. (1978) Experiment 3 so it is included in
the table from the original article where procedural details may be obtained;
qthe results showed a statistical trend toward synnnetric MDR but did not reach alpha = .05;
rthis study compared a "relaxed" (R) to an "exercise" (E) "state" condition; the parentheses are used
to indicate that presumably two levels of "autonomic arousal" rather than mood states per se were
compared;
Sa combined Velten-type and a hypnotic procedure was used to induce mood states in this study;
tthe mood listed for this study is "F" for fear on the assumption that this was the predominant emotion
elicited by the author's use of mild electric shock to alter the subject's "state";
UMDR was observed for items early in the list though results for the entire list were insignificant (see
text for a discussion of this finding);
VH
happy; S = sad; R = "relaxed"; E = "exercise"; F = fear; NF = no fear; A = anger; D = depression;
M =mania (euphoria).
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asymmetric MDR.

The studies by Clark and Teasdale (1982) and Henry,

Weingartner, and Murphy (1973) studied adults with diagnoses of unipolar major affective disorder and bipolar major affective disorder
(experiencing episodes both mania and depression) which had mean ages
of 43 and 44 years, respectively.
young, adult, college students.
MDR.

All other studies in Table 1 used
All age groups showed some degree of

Therefore, age does not appear to be a major determining factor

of MDR.
The diagnostic groups studied both produced symmetrical MDR
only.

All other groups studied produced more variable results.

However, there are only two studies using clinical groups, and future
studies with such groups may produce more variable degrees of MDR.

In

any case it is not likely that the presence of psychopathology per se
accounts for the consistency across these two studies.

The nature of

the psychopathology across the two groups is quite different on a
whole spectrum of dimensions:

i.e., symptomatology (both experience

depression but only one by diagnostic criteria can

~

have exper-

ienced episodes of mania), presumed psychological and biological etiologies, response to biological and psychological treatment (one group
generally responds to "antidepressant medications" while the other
generally responds to an entirely different medication type; that is,
lithium), and the life-course prognosis of the disorder (one generally
decreases in severity with age while the other generally does not).
What probably is common across the two clinical groups is the "intensity" of the emotional or mood states they experience.

Of all sub-

jects studied in Table 1, the clinical groups probably experienced
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the most intense levels of "sadness" (depression) and in the case of
the bipolar group, "happiness" (more precisely, "euphoria").

The

variable of emotion intensity will be considered again after other
differences between the studies have been evaluated.
Materials.

A variety of materials have been used to examine

memory across the MDR studies:

single or double word-lists, word-

associations, simple phrases, stories, personality trait terms (positive, negative, and neutral in connotation), and autobiographical
memories.

MDR effects have been found with each type of variable

though each has not always shown an MDR effect.

Specifically, Bower

et al. (1978) in Experiments 1 and 2 failed to find MDR with single
word-lists but did find MDR when two word-lists were used.

The

authors argued that the single-word lists make for a "ceiling effect"
that masked any MDR that might have been observed.

However, Leight

and Ellis (1981) used a single word-list and found asymmetric MDR.
Thus, it does not seem likely that either subject characteristics or material type can be considered independent causes of MDR
variability in this set of studies.
Mood-manipulation methods.

Four different methods of controlling

for mood variation in MDR studies have been used:

1) hypnosis; 2) an

"autosuggestive" procedure designed by Velten (1968) that requires the
subject

to read a series of mood-relevant statements that the subject

is to "imagine" as being true for him or herself; 3) a variety of
more "naturalistic" methods such as mild shock, reading happy and
sad stories, remembering happy and sad recent autobiographical experiences, and success/failure at a computer game (see Table 1 notes for
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the complete list and the studies which used them);

and 4) classi-

fication of subjects by endogenously-produced mood states (i.e., the
two clinical groups, see Table 1).

Each method of mood "manipulation"

has produced some degree of MDR.
Moods studied.
pared in MDR studies.

A variety of moods or emotions have been comThe vast majority of studies (71%) have com-

pared "happy" and "sad" moods, though fear, anger, "relaxation," and
"exercise" conditions have also been studied.

Clark, Milberg, and

Ross (1983) argued that variations in "autonomic arousal" per se are
sufficient to produce MDR.

They found evidence for their assertion

when they compared a "relaxation" to an "exercise" condition.

How-

ever, the authors did not actually measure the "emotional states" or
"arousal levels" of their subjects.

Mandler (1984) has argued that

autonomic arousal is a non-specific component of emotional states
that is "interpreted" in terms of the thoughts and environmental
events covarying with it.

He suggests arousal amplifies cognitive

"appraisals" into "emotional states."

If this is the case we may

assume Clark et al. 's (1983) subjects did experience emotions.

We

simply do not know what these emotions were.
Anger was studied in combination with fear, joy, and sadness
in Bower's (1981) Experiment 4 presented in detail earlier.

The

reliable and very systematic effects observed indicated that distinct
emotions were produced and the polarity/similarity relations between
them affected memory.
Fear was studied in a much less precise way in the Macht, Spear,
and Levis (1977) study where mild shocks were used.

The authors
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recognized that some type of anxiety was produced through this method,
but they did not systematically assess it in Experiment 1 or 3.

When

Experiment 1 produced symmetric MDR the authors wanted to be sure that
it could be attributed to the anxiety produced by shock.

They

attempted to measure anxiety in Experiment 2 with galvanic skin response (GSR).

Apparently, however, the introduction of GSR measure-

ments (the sole change across studies 1-3) was sufficient to alter the
conditions producing MDR because none was initially observed in Experiment 2.

Experiment 3 (without GSR measurements) was conducted to

verify the results of Experiment 1.
3 revealed no MDR.

Upon initial analysis Experiment

When the results of the three studies were re-

analyzed by sex of subject, males were found to produce MDR across
all three experiemnts, but females did so only in Experiments 1 and 3.
A further analysis tested whether a "serial-position" effect could be
observed such that items learned early in list learning trials were
affected by MDR.

This showed both males and females exhibited MDR

in Experiments 1 and 3, but only males did so in Experiment 2.
The complex results of Macht et al. (1977) may be artifactual.
However, Polivy (1981) reports data indicating threat of shock produces emotions, though the resulting emotional "state" is more properly considered a "blend" of fear, anger, and sadness rather than just
fear alone.

If we can generalize from a "threat of shock" to an

actual mild shock condition then Polivy's (1981) results may help
explain the Macht et al. (1977) findings.

Polivy (1981) found that

shock threat not only produces reliable increases in three emotions,
but as well, the three emotions show rapid temporal fluctuations in
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their respective intensities.

Sadness rapidly decreases (over 5-10

minutes) while anger increases (same time period).

Thus, the "serial

position" effect of Macht et al. (1977) may reflect this waxing and
waning of different emotions;

and, of course, it is the presence of

such emotions which is assumed to produce MDR.

Finally, Polivy

(1981) reports a reliable three-way interaction between sex of subject, sex of investigator, and time period (from the moment of shock
threat) on the intensities of the three emotions elicited by this
method of mood manipulation.

Her results (Polivy, 1981) indicate that

female investigators induce more fear;

and over time the tendency to

become more fearful with an investigator of the opposite sex (i.e.,
subsequently both sexes show a sex of investigator X sex of subject
interaction) increases especially in "high threat" conditions.

Thus,

the "state" of the subject over the entire 5-10 minute learning periods used by Macht et al. (1977) may, indeed, have been very different
when the specific emotions involved are considered.

Polivy's study

suggests that much greater attention must be paid to emotion-specifici ty and temporal fluctuations in emotions in MDR studies.
Polarity.

A final consideration regarding the moods studied in

the MDR experiments is their "polarity."

Eighteen of the studies

compared the polar effects of joy and sadness.

Clark et al. (1983)

compared a "relaxed" to an "exercise" condition, but this, too, would
conceivably meet the criteria of "polar" states in the broadest sense.
However, five other studies did not compare polar states in any sense
of this term.

Clark and Teasdale (1982) compared the effects of

variations in the intensity of depression.

Macht et al. (1977)
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compared the effects of consistent shock (shock-shock condition) with
variable shock or no shock at all in three experiments.

Finally,

Leight and Ellis (1981) compared induced sadness to a "neutral mood
state" condition.

Of these five studies the latter four seem

problematic.
This is clearer if three conunon assumptions about affective
"states" (as opposed to other types of "states" produced through
exogenous substances such as alcohol or drugs) are considered.

The

first assumption is that some type of emotion is always present in
subjects.

The second is that emotions are continuously variable

quantities (i.e., have a real underlying dimension of "intensity").
And the third is that certain emotional states are opposites or
polarized in some sense (Izard, 1971; Plutchik, 1980; Tompkins, 1962,
1963; Wessman & Ricks, 1966).

This suggests that comparing an induced

emotional state to an unmanipulated neutral one is more a conceptual
exercise than an empirical one.

Subjects categorized as "neutral"

probably are experiencing some type and degree of affect.
do not know what it might be.

We simply

Of course, this criticism does not

apply when investigator measures the state of the subjects and sets a
criterion for the categorization of subjects as neutral.

In the

latter case we have some empirical referent for the presumed neutral
emotional state.
These considerations make it difficult to interpret the results
of the sad versus "neutral" comparison by Leight and Ellis (1981) and
the Macht et al. (1977) shock, variable shock, and no shock conditions.
Since two of the four experiments (see Table 1) showed some degree of
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MDR this presents a real dilemma.

The variable results across all 24

MDR experiments must be attributed to either real variability in the
phenomena or to improper experimental control over the key parameters
of the process by the investigator.

In the case of the studies by

Leight and Ellis (1981) and Macht et al. (1977) the latter appears
more likely to have been the case.

In subsequent analyses of the

entire 24 studies, then the results of these four experiments will not
be considered.

The data from Polivy (1981) supports my rejection of

the Macht et al. (1977) series;

and, the conceptual analysis given

to comparisons of an "emotional" to a "neutral" state is the basis for
rejecting the Leight and Ellis (1981) asymmetric MDR result.

In

effect, this eliminates two positive and two negative MDR results
across two types of induction conditions (shock and Velten induction).
Emotional intensity.

Several authors have speculated that the

intensity of emotional states may be a parameter influencing MDR
studies.

For example, Clark et al. (1983) argue variations in "auto-

nomic arousal" may produce MDR.

In a somewhat different vein Macht

et al. (1977) and Nashy and Yando (1982, footnote 2) argue asymmetric
MDR may be due to the failure to induce sufficiently intense emotional
states.

Finally, Teasdale and Taylor (1981) present evidence that

differences in the accessibility of memories between mood conditions
(i.e., happy and sad) correlate with the extent to which the moods
actually differed between the conditions.

The correlations between

happy and sad moods and the rated intensity (by subject) of happy
and sad memories were statistically significant.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare directly and

,,
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objectively MDR studies in terms of emotional intensity.

Only four

studies used standardized measures of mood states (specifically, the
studies by Teasdale and his colleagues, see Table 1).

Indeed, some

investigators did not even measure mood changes at all but simply
assumed that they changed as a result of mood manipulations (e.g.,
Bower et al., 1978, Experiments 1-3; Bower [1981], Experiment 4; !sen
et al. [1978], Experiment 2; Macht et al. [1977], Experiments 1 and
3).

In future studies this could easily be corrected since several

standardized mood assessment devices are available (Lorr & McNair,
1982; Lubin, 1967; Underwood & Froming, 1980; Zuckerman & Lubin,
1965).
Lacking objective criteria for mood intensities across studies,
a more intuitively based comparison can be made.

One would expect the

unipolar major depressives and the bipolar major depressives to be
experiencing the most intense emotional states.

A more moderate degree

of emotional intensity may be attributed to those subjects who underwent hypnotic and Velten (1968) type mood inductions.
cedures actually have three striking similarities.

These two pro-

First, both pro-

cedures involve the use of "suggestions" (i.e., in hypnosis it is
given by investigator; in Velten's procedure they are given one at a
time on index cards).

Second, both procedures involve the selective

focusing of attention upon the specific suggestions (i.e., the hypnotist acts as the "focuser" in one procedure while the index cards
produce the same or similar effect in the other).

And three, both

procedures request subjects to engage in an "imaginative involvement"
with the suggestions.

The primary difference between the procedures
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is that one is basically interpersonal (hypnosis) while the other
occurs in a more individualistic context.

Previous hypnosis research

suggests that many of the effects of hypnosis may be obtained either
through "autosuggestive" or more interpersonal procedures (Fronnn,
Brown, Hurt, Oberlander, Boxer, & Pfiefer, 1981).

Therefore, it is

probably legitimate to assume that both hypnosis and the Velten-type
inductions produced similar (moderate) intensities of emotional
states in subjects.
The least intense emotional states can probably be attributed
to the more "naturalistic" mood inductions.

Success/failure at a

computer game, reading happy and sad stories, physical exercise, and
simply recalling happy and sad recent autobiographical events intuitively uould seem to produce less intense emotions than would an
"autosuggestive" (Velten technique) or hypnotic mood induction.

Thus,

we can rank the different induction methods from most to least "intensive" as:

clinical groups, the hypnotic and Velten procedures,

and the "naturalistic" ones.

The only exception to this ranking may

be the Macht et al. (1977) shock inductions.

This method, despite

being classified as "naturalistic" in Table 1, would probably belong
in the group of studies inducing "moderately" intense emotions (i.e.,
the hypnotic and Velten methods).

However, as previously discussed,

this study and the one by Leight and Ellis (1981) have already been
excluded from subsequent analyses.

One can note, however, that

inclusion of both of these reports would not substantially alter the
results which emerge from the present analysis.
When Table 1 is examined with the current classification of
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presumed emotional intensities in mind, a trend can be observed.

The

"less intense" induction methods produced more variable MDR results
than did the more "moderate" and "high" intensity methods of manipulating subjects' moods.

Table 2 presents the proportion of studies

in the "high, moderate, and low intensity groups" finding each degree
of MDR (none, asynunetric, and synunetric).
ly.

The results are very order-

Studies using subjects presumed to be experiencing more moder-

ately or highly intense emotional states also produced the largest
proportion of MDR results (either synunetric or asynunetric) and the
smallest proportions of failures to observe MDR.

Table 2 also shows

that the proportions would not change substantially if the Leight and
Ellis (1981) and Macht et al. (1977) experiments were included (see
Table 2, note a),
It should be noted that the number of studies in the "high intensity" row is only two.

The proportions may change as more MDR

studies are conducted with diagnosed clinical groups.

However, when

only the "low" and "moderate" intensity groups are compared, the
differences between them are still apparent.

Therefore, it remains

possible that differences in the intensity of the emotional states
across studies accounts for the variability in degree of MDR observed.
The blending of emotions in mood states.

A second possibility

that may account for the variability across studies is the presence
of multiple emotions in both naturalistically occurring (Izard, 1972,
1977; Plutchik, 1980; Tompkins, 1962, 1963) and induced (Polivy, 1981)
affective states.

Emotion theorists have long argued that emotions

rarely occur in isolation;

rather, they tend to occur in
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Table 2

-

proportion of Studies Finding Synnnetric, Asynnnetric, and No Mood-

E_ependent Recall as a Function of Intensity of Emotional States
presumed to Result from Different Induction Proceduresa

Degree of Mood Dependent Recall
Mood-Intensity
Low (N = 5)
Moderate

(~

High (N = 2)

Note.

= 12)

Symmetric

Asymmetric

None

16.6%

33.3%

50%

58.3%

25%

16.6%

100%

0%

0%

aThe mood-induction methods were ranked from low-moderatehigh. All studies in the "Naturalistic" section of Table 1
except Macht et al. (1977) are included in the "low intensity group." All studies from the "Hypnotic" and "Velten
Technique" sections of Table 1 are included in the "moderate intensity group" except Leight and Ellis (1981). The
two studies in the "Pathological States" section of Table 1
comprise the "high intensity group." If the two excluded
studies are incorporated into the "moderate intensity
group" the proportions for this row become: symmetric =
to%; asymmetric = 25%; and no effect = 25%.
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"combinations" (Izard, 1972, 1977) or "blends" (Plutchik, 1980).
Plutchik (1980) argues, for example, that "contempt" consists of the
blending of the two more "basic" emotions of anger and disgust.
The blending of emotions in affective states may be particularly
important when moods are induced.

Polivy (1981) has shown that a

variety of mood-induction methods produce multiple emotions even when
the inductions were intended to produce only one emotional state.
This appears to be especially true when negative or sad emotional
states are induced.

She presents data showing that inductions in-

tended to increase only sadness also increased anger and hostility.
In one study (Experiment 3a) an induction to increase depression
actually increased the intercorrelation of anxiety, depression, and
hostility to an average

E.

= .88.

The careful examination of multiple emotions reported in Teasdale's (Teasdale et al., 1980; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981) MDR research
verifies the relevance of Polivy's (1981) findings.

Teasdale used

Velten's (1968) procedure to induce elation and depression.
rated their mood states after

Subjects

each induction on 0-100 point scales

for despondency, anxiety, and happiness.

Each induction produced

statistically significant differences on each of the affect scales.
The exact scores were:

elation condition (despondency = 8.5; anxiety

= 18.5; happiness= 71.7);

depression condition (despondency= 44.8;

anxiety= 28.5; happiness= 37.0).

The depression condition appears

to produce a more "mixed" affective state than the elation condition.
This was also observed in Teasdale and Taylor (1981) even though the
Velten-type induction was modified to eliminate any reference to the
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subject's life experiences (to avoid "cueing" affective autobiographical memories which was the dependent measure in the research).
the same three affective scales the scores were:

Using

elation condition

(despondency= 13.1; anxiety= 18.4; happiness= 62.9);

depression

condition (despondency= 48.4; anxiety= 21; happiness= 29.8).

Thus,

not only are multiple affects induced by inductions targeted at only
one emotion, but the "depression" inductions also produce more "mixed"
affective states than do "elation" inductions.
This is relevant to the data in Table 2.

There are 5 studies

(Bartlett & Santrock, 1979; Bartlett et al., 1982, Bower, 1981, Experiment 2 and 3; Natale & Hantas, 1982) that compared the effects of
happy/sad moods on memory and also obtained asymmetric MDR results.
Ineachof these studies the sad emotional state failed to influence
memory to the degree the happy state did, i.e., was the cause of the
asymmetric pattern of MDR results.

The studies by Bower (1981) and

Natale and Hantas (1982) used happy and sad

autobiographical memories

as the dependent variable while the studies by Bartlett (Bartlett &
Santrock, 1979; Bartlett et al., 1982) used word lists.

Since the

studies use different induction procedures and different types of
recollections, the asymmetric MDR observed may be due to the greater
mixture of emotions produced by depression inductions.
If emotion intensity and the blending of emotions is influencing
the results of MDR studies, then it would be useful to have a model of
affective states which addresses these two aspects of emotions.

Plut-

chik (1980) argues that three parameters of emotions, i.e., intensity,
polarity, and similarity, are sufficient to differentiate between
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discrete emotions in overall affective states.

Figure 4 presents

Plutchik's (1980) model of the interaction between the three parameters of emotions.

The idea captured by this figure is that emotions

become less distinctive at lower intensities.

As intensity decreases,

emotions become more similar (decreasing circumference) and less
polarized (decreasing diameter).
emotional intensity.

The opposite occurs with increasing

Thus, emotional intensity modulates the degree

of blending (or similarity and polarity) between emotions in affective
states.
Teasdale's (Teasdale et al., 1980; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981) data,
presented earlier, support this conceptualization.

When the "despon-

dency" and "happiness" values changed across the studies so, too, did
the values for the other emotions measured.
Figure 4 presents the relations between emotions at a single
point in time.

The argument just made, however, draws explicitly upon

the temporal dimension of emotional states, e.g., polar emotions at
high intensities are not likely to be experienced at the same time.
Thus, a fourth temporal dimension is required to more completely
understand the relations between emotions in mood states.

Recent

empirical work highlights this clearly.
Diener and Emmons (1985; Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons,
1985) have shown that intensity and polarity are, indeed, independent
parameters of emotional states that temporally interact in the overall affective experience of individuals.

Diener and Emmons (1985,

Experiment 4) had subjects complete three-week, daily, and "moment"
(i.e., at the moment of the experience) reports of happy and sad
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Figure 4.a

Plutchik's Circumplex Model Incorporating
the Intensity Dimension of Emotions

aThis figure is adapted from Plutchik (1980, p. 113, Figure 11.3).
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emotions.

The principal finding was that the relations between joy

and sadness differed greatly depending on the time frame considered.
The strongest negative correlation (i.e., polarity) between the two
affects occurred during strongly emotional (i.e., high intensity)
times as measured in the "moment" reports.

The negative correlation,

however, decreased in a linear fashion as the time span covered increased logarithmically.

They also presented evidence that polarity

and intensity are empirically separable dimensions of affect.

When

the intensity of emotions was evaluated they found systematic individual differences between subjects.

Individuals were quite consistent

across both emotions (happy versus sad) in terms of how intensely
they reported experiencing the emotions.

Some subjects report high

intensities for both sadness and joy (experienced at different times),
while others would very seldomly report experiencing high intensity
levels of either emotion.

Thus, when joy and sadness are measured

systematically (i.e., daily) over time, the relationships between
their temporal occurrence and their intensity and polarity can be
generalized as follows.

Duration and intensity are inversely corre-

lated aspects of emotional experience, while intensity and polarity
are positively correlated aspects of emotional experience.

The first

relation occurs because typically strong emotions do not last very
long and hence will not be present across several measurement periods.
The second relation occurs because, at any given time period, when
happiness is experienced intensely, sadness will not be measured as
present.

Thus, these authors provide evidence for the way in which

intensity and polarity are conceptualized in Figure 4.
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In light of Bower's (1981, Experiment 4) demonstration that
Plutchik's (1980) similarity relations between emotions can accurately
predict differential MDR across emotions, it would be useful to see if
the intensity and polarity relations could be useful as well.

Spe-

cifically, will the circumplex model be useful in understanding symmetric versus asymmetric MDR?

One would expect that several emotions

would show more blending when they occur at lower intensities.

This

blending of emotions might, therefore, result in a poorer "match"
across encoding and retrieval periods because many situational factors
may slightly alter the "blend" present within the overall affective
state of the subject.

This would be especially likely to occur when

subjects at low intensities of emotion are used in MDR experiments.
The following might, therefore, be expected.
When two polar emotions such as joy and sadness are used in an
MDR experiment only subjects at the more extreme ranges of emotional
intensity (on each emotion) will show synnnetric MDR.

This follows

from the assumption that low and moderate emotion intensity subjects
will be experiencing more "blending" of different emotions in their
overall affective state.

In addition, since the situational and cog-

nitive events determining which emotions will be "blending" are largely
outside the control of the investigator, as a general prediction,
asymmetric MDR or no MDR would be expected from subjects experiencing
moderate and low levels of emotion intensity.

The "encoding specific-

ity principle" makes it possible, in principle at least, to make more
exact predictions for each subject at all levels of emotion intensity.
However, to empirically realize this possibility will require a degree
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of experimental control over emotional states in subjects that has
at the present time not yet been demonstrated as feasible.
A second prediction can be made from Plutchik's (1980) model
that involves all eight emotions.

If we assume that memories of events

encode all of the "features" of an experience (or psychological
"state"), then it follows that memories will encode the combination of
emotions present at the time of encoding.

This suggests one could

examine the affective contents of autobiographical memories to determine whether the similarity-polarity features of the circumplex model
can be identified.
Wynne and Schiffman (1965) developed an emotion coding manual
for EMs that was subsequently refined by Plutchik and Wynne (1974).
This manual can be used to code the presence of all eight of the
emotions illustrated in Figure 4.
One might, therefore, expect that when the emotions of joy, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, acceptance, surprise and expectancy are
coded in EMs, a circumplex pattern will be observed between the emotions.

This possibility warrants the following considerations.

Plut-

chik (1980) has argued that the particular "pattern" to be observed
between the eight emotions depends critically on the intensity level
of emotions being studied.

In addition, the particular measure of

similarity used has also to some extent altered the pattern he has
found in his own studies.

Therefore, " • • • any one study of intensity

of the primary emotions will provide only an approximation to the
structure" (Plutchik, 1980, p. 159).

Emotions at moderate to high

levels of intensity are required to observe the circumplex pattern in
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Figure 2.
Memories encoding emotions at sufficiently high levels of intensity would, therefore, be required to produce a circumplex pattern.
Since simply coding the presence and intensity of eight emotions in
EMs presents a considerable challenge (primarily in terms of reliability and validity), one would not expect to find "perfect" circumplexity.

However, if some degree of circumplexity can be observed

between the emotions, then this can be taken as evidence in support of
the validity and usefulness of Plutchik's (1980) model for understanding MDR variability.
The next section of this report will present these ideas in a
more formal fashion as hypotheses.

A method of circumplex analysis

will then be discussed, since it will be used to test for the presence
of circumplexity between emotions in EMs.

CHAPTER II
HYPOTHESES AND THE METHOD OF CIRCUMPLEX ANALYSIS
The present chapter presents the hypotheses to be tested and the
method and logic of circumplex analysis to be used in evaluating
several of the hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Three issues will be considered:

(1) The effects of mood states

upon recall, (2) the relations among different emotions encoded in EMs,
and (3) the influence of current emotional states and emotions in EMs
upon the frequency of "screen memories."
Emotional influences upon memory.

With regard to MDR, Hypoth-

esis 1 states subjects experiencing a happy mood at recall will
retrieve more happy EMs than will sad subjects.

Hypothesis 2 states

subjects who are sad at recall will retrieve more sad EMs than will
happy subjects.

Hypothesis 3 states subjects who are sad will recall

more sad EMs than happy EMs.

And Hypothesis 4 states happy subjects

will retrieve more happy EMs than sad EMs.

These hypotheses predict

symmetric MDR irrespective of the intensity level of a subject's
mood state.

The alternative prediction, based on the assumption that

mood intensity is non-linearly related to the degree of MDR, can be
stated as Hypothesis 5:

Only subjects experiencing more extreme

levels of happy and sad moods will show symmetric MDR, more moderate
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mood subjects will show either asymmetric or no MDR.
The relations among different emotions encoded in memories.
Hypothesis 6 states that the 8 basic emotions of fear, anger, joy,
sadness, disgust, acceptance, expectancy, and surprise will be identifiable in EMs and that they will show correlational relationships
conforming to the circumplex model (Plutchik, 1980).

This hypothesis

will be tested 6 times, i.e., in five separate EMs and in a "summed"
EM (a composite score summed across the five EMs).
Emotions and the "survey characteristics" of EMs.

Several

exploratory questions will be considered with regard to the structural
features of EMs.
quality of EMs?

First, are there sex differences in the reported
And second, do the qualities of EMs show any relation

to either current emotional states or to emotions rated in EM content?
Of particular interest will be whether "screen memories" show a relationship to current emotions or to emotions encoded in EMs.

Finally,

since the features of EMs to be examined are closely related to those
studied by Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz

(1982), a comparison across

the two independent samples will be made.

This should reveal the

extent to which college age subjects show similarities in the basic
structural features of EMs.
The Logic and Method of Circumplex Analysis
The method of circumplex analysis as described by Guttman (1966),
Steiger (1979), and Wiggins, Steiger and Gaelic (1981) is actually
a very general structural modeling procedure.

The method is structur-

al in that it results in a specification of the relationship between
each variable in an analysis;

the method is general because different
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types of relations can be hypothesized and tested with the method.
The present discussion draws upon the method articulated by Wiggins
et al. (1981).
The term "circumplex analysis" derives from Guttman's (1966)
recognition that the varying magnitude of correlation between variables can be graphically portrayed in terms of a circle.

Variables

more highly correlated are placed closer to one another while variables
with lower correlations are placed further apart around the circumference of a circle.

The resulting display illustrates the ordering

among a set of variables in terms of magnitude of correlation.
tive and zero-order correlations can occur.

Nega-

This is especially true

for interpersonal and emotional variables (Plutchik, 1980; Wiggins
et al., 1981).

When negative correlations occur, this relationship

between variables is called one of polarity or bipolarity.

This is

illustrated diagramatically by placing polar opposites at the two ends
of a diameter through the circle.
While the results of a circumplex analysis are displayed in the
form of a circle, the method of detecting circumplexity involves the
identification of a specific pattern in correlation matrices
(Steiger, 1979; Wiggins et al., 1981).

The pattern sought in a matrix

of variables assumed to have circumplexity can be illustrated with
Table 3.

This table refers to a matrix of eight variables only and

this applies to the following discussion as well.

The letter "p" is

used to represent the greek letter rho since the table refers to the
population parameters of variables exhibiting circumplexity.

It can

be seen that each minor diagonal in the table is associated with a
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Table 3
Representation of the Circumplex Pattern in a Correlation Matrix

VARIABLE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

pl >

p2 >

p3 >

p4

1

1

2

pl

1

3

p2

pl

1

4

p3

p2

pl

1

5

P4

p3

p2

pl

1

6

P3

P4

P3

p2

pl

1

7

p2

p3

P4

p3

p2

pl

1

8

pl

Pz

p3

p4

p3

p2

pl

NOTE:

1

1

The letter "p" is used to represent the greek symbol for
the letter rho, the population correlation coefficient.

1Adapted from Wiggins, Steiger, and Gaelic (1981, Table 1, p. 267).
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different rho value.

The table also states that the rho's (1-4)

conform to the inequality rho 1 > rho 2 > rho 3 > rho 4.

Whenever

this inequality holds the matrix has "circular" properties.

Rho 1

refers to variables adjacent to one another, rho 2 to variables
separated by one other variable, rho 3 to variables separated by two
other variables, and rho 4 to variables separated by three others.
In an 8 x 8 matrix of variables assumed to have bipolarity, the inequality pattern between rho's takes on one additional characteristic.
Rho 1 is a positive correlation.

Rho 2 is a zero-order correlation.

Rho 3 is a negative correlation.

And rho 4 is a negative correlation

of even larger magnitude.

This follows from the geometric pattern

that 8 variables can have around a circle.

Rho 4 variables are 180

degrees apart, rho 3 variables are 120 degrees apart, rho 2 variables
are 90 degrees apart, and rho 1 variables are 45 degrees apart.

This

can be seen in Figure 2 of Plutchik's (1980) circumplex of 8 emotions.
Initial evaluation of circumplexity is done by obtaining an
estimate of the rho values and determining whether the inequality
pattern holds.

In addition, however, the magnitude of the rho's

reflect the magnitude of the principal components, or "latent structures," presumed to underly the empirical correlations (Wiggins et al.,
1981).

In a matrix of "perfectly" circumplex variables, only five

types of principal components can be extracted (Wiggins et al., 1981).
These are circumplex, polarity, orthogonality, specificity, and
general components.

The specificity and general components are each

based upon a single latent vector associated with a single latent
root.

The other three components each have two latent vectors and
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roots.

Of these five types all but the circumplexity component

reflect deviations from perfect circumplexity.

Thus, the magnitude

of the rho's indicate the amount of empirical variation that can be
attributed to each type of principal component.

Obviously, the more

variation "captured" by the circumplexity component, the more adequate
will be one's "circumplex model."
Variance attributable to each type of principal component can
be interpreted in a rather straightforward fashion except for the
general and specificity components.

A portion of the variance of the

rho's can be attributed directly to circumplexity.

Variance attribut-

able to the polarity and orthogonality principal components reflect
deviations from perfect polarity and orthogonality.

Thus, the latter

components measure the variance which cannot be attributed to circumplexity.

The general and specificity components are much more

difficult to interpret especially when an
upon the rho's.

analysis is conducted

In general, they reflect variation due to the

specific methods and variables used in an analysis (Wiggins et al.,
1981).

The variation of interest, of course, is that attributable

to circumplexity.

Since the present study is not concerned with

refining the circumplex model tested (which is when the orthogonality,
polarity, general, and specificity components assume more importance),
only the variation due to circumplexity will be of major concern.
There are several methods for estimating the rho-values;
each differs in computational complexity and parametric distributional
characteristics (Wiggins et al., 1981).

The latter affects the

validity of the statistical goodness-of-fit tests that can be
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performed upon them.

Generalized least square (GLS) estimates of the

rho's, however, appear to be the best compromise choice, and this
method will be used here.
Once the rho's have been computed and inspected for the inequality pattern, several further procedures can be used to assess
the adequacy of a circumplex in modeling the empirical data.
main issues guide this analysis.

Two

First, the degree of circumplexity

observed; and second, the proportion of empirical variance accounted
for by the principal components underlying the matrix.
Unfortunately, there is no simple and fully adequate method of
answering the first issue.

Wiggins et al. (1981) suggest the

following five procedures.

First, estimate the rho's to determine

whether a circular ordering can be used to represent the magnitude
of correlation between variables.

Second, if the inequality of the

rho's is present, then perform a chi-square test to assess the
correspondence between the empirical and rho-matrix (i.e., construct
a matrix with the rho estimates inserted into the positions outlined
in Table 3).

Third, perform a principal components analysis upon

either or both the empirical and rho-matrices.

The latter should be

equivalent to the former in at least one sense (Wiggins et al.,
1981);

the amount of variance attributable to each type of principal

component should be the same whether computations are performed upon
the rho-estimates or upon the empirical matrix.

And fourth, one

can compute a mean square residual (MSR) between the empirical and
rho matrices to quantitatively assess the fit between the rho's.and
the empirical correlations.

Obviously, the smaller the MSR, the
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greater the fit.

Finally, one can compute a Wilson-Hilferty z-score

for the chi-square statistic (Wilson & Hilferty, 1931).

This trans-

forms chi-squares with different degrees of freedom (df) into a
standard normal deviate with 1 df allowing comparison of chi-squares
across studies.

The latter is useful in assessing the adequacy of a

circumplex model across studies so as to provide a relative sense of
goodness-to-fit of the model to data.
Each of the procedures advocated by Wiggins et al. (1982) is
useful for assessing different aspects of the fit between data and
the circumplex model.

The key test of "fit," the chi-square, suffers

from one major drawback, however.

The statistic is sensitive to any

departures at all between the rho and empirical matrices.

Thus, the

empirical data would have to possess perfect circumplexity, especially
when the sample size is large, to avoid a significant chi-square
value.

For hypothesis testing purposes, however, a perfect fit is

seldom achievable.

And, it may not be the most important question.

The degree of fit between data and a circumplex model is ultimately
more of value than whether a perfect fit does or does not occur.
When degree of fit is the paramount question all of the procedures advocated by Wiggins et al. (1981) except the chi-square are
of value since each provides a quantitative index of goodness-of-fit.
Unfortunately, though, they are not statistical indexes so that
alpha and beta cannot be determined.
Because the chi-square test appears to be the only statistical
test currently available, the authors suggest a liberal interpretation should be made of it.

Thus, instead of either rejecting or
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failing to reject the null hypothesis of "no circumplexity" the
authors recommend the use of the Wilson-Hiferty

~-score.

With the

latter the adequacy of a circumplex model across studies can be
made.
The procedures advocated by Wiggins et al. (1981) will be
followed in the present study.

James Steiger's FORTRAN IV program

MULTICORR 2 will be used to compute the rho's.

In addition, this

program uses a Fisher's r-to-z transform, especially useful for small
samples, and computes a chi-square based on this transformation.

The

calculation of the principal components underlying the matrix will
be done upon the rho-estimates using the formulas provided by
Wiggins et al. (1981).
In addition to these procedures, however, two further types of
analyses will be conducted.

First, a principal components analysis

will be conducted upon the raw data, specifically, the summed emotion
scores across all the EMs.

This analysis will be useful in determin-

ing the validity of the rating system.
be "rotated."

The obtained components can

If an eight-factor solution can be rotated to "simple

structure," then this will support the assumption that eight different
emotions are being rated by the coding process.
Second, since the principal components analysis will be done
on the rho-estimates, for purposes of assessing circumplexity, some
means of assessing the amount of total empirical variation used in the
analysis will be useful.

A method of estimating this percentage of

empirical variation used in the circumplex analysis of the rho's is
as follows (see Appendix F).

The total empirical variation can be
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partitioned into two components.

The variance of the rho's measures

one component and the MSR measures the other.

The ratio:

variance

of the rho's I the sum of the rho-variance plus the MSR, provides a
quantitative measure of the proportion of empirical variance utilized
in the circumplex analysis.
Theratioobtained in this fashion is useful because the circumplex analysis is not done on the total empirical variation in the raw
matrix.

Rather, it is done on the variation captured in the rho-

estimates.

When principal components are extracted from the rho-

estimates, all of the empirical variation will not be used.
variation not used is measured by the MSR.

The

Correspondingly, the

variance attributable to each type of principal component, including
circumplexity, will be inflated.

The ultimate question is the amount

of empirical variance due to circumplexity, not just the amount of
variance in the rho's which can be attributed to circumplexity.
A more accurate estimate of the empirical variation attributable
to circumplexity can be obtained with the following ratio:

variance

in the rho's attributable to circumplexity principal component
divided by the proportion of total empirical variation captured by
the rho's.

This ratio uses as its denominator the ratio given earlier.

This will provide a quantitative index of the amount of empirical
variation which can be attributed to circumplexity.
Estimates of the principal components underlying a matrix can
be obtained by direct computation from the rho-estimates (Wiggins
et al., 1981).

Alternatively, the components can be extracted from

the empirical correlation matrix.

The magnitude of variation
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attributable to each type of principal component should be the same
using either the estimation of the direct procedure (Wiggins et al.,
1981).

Logically, however, there is a distinction between the

procedures.

Direct extraction from the empirical correlation matrix

utilizes all of the variation between the variables.

Computing the

principal components from the rho-estimates uses only variance "captured" by the rho's.

The latter will always be less than the total

variation in an empirical matrix unless it has perfect circumplexity.

CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 53 college students recruited through the Loyola
University, Department of Psychology Experimental Subject Pool.
Subjects were offered course credit for their participation in the
study.

Five subjects were eliminated from the final sample either

because they had not completed all of the data collections forms or
because it was apparent that they had responded randomly on one or
more of them.

The final sample consisted of 48 subjects.

There were

14 males with a mean of 19 years (SD = 1.44) and 34 females with a
mean age of 18.4 years (SD= .95).
Procedure
All subjects were tested in large groups of approximately 15.
Each subject completed the following forms:

The Emotions Profile

Index (EPI; Plutchik & Kellerman, 1974), the Profile of Mood StatesBipolar Form (POMS-B: Lorr & McNair, 1982), Five Early Memory Recording Forms (EMRF; see Appendix A) and an Early Memories Ranking Sheet
(see Appendix B).

The materials were presented to each subject in a

packet to which was affixed a disclosure and consent form (see
Appendix C).

Subjects read the disclosure form, and if they decided

to participate on an informed basis, they were requested to sign the
consent form and to proceed through the assessment package.
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The order of the assessment forms in the complete package was
randomized across subjects.

Only the EMRFs

were filled out in

sequence from one to five, in order to preserve the order of recall
of ERs for later analysis.

It took approximately 1.5 hours to com-

plete the entire assessment package.
Scoring.

The EPI and the POMS-B were scored following the

criteria set out in their respective manuals.

Only the Elation scale

of the POMS-B was scored since the other scales were not relevant to
the current study.

The EMRF required each subject to recall an EM and

then to complete a series of questions about the recalled event.
following information was requested:

The

age at the time of the event,

frequency of previous recall (just now, occasionally before, frequently before), affective quality (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant),
prose description of predominant emotions in the EM, and rating for
the presence/absence of various sensory qualities (auditory, gustatory,
kinesthetic, visual, and tactile).

If visual imagery was reported,

subjects were asked to describe whether others only, or the self
could be observed in the memory.

Presence of color qualities (black

and white, or chromatic) was also requested.

Finally, subjects were

asked to describe any feelings or thought they had about the EM.
After all EMs had been recalled, subjects were asked to rank order
the EMs in terms of their current importance or meaning to the
subjects.
Rating the EMs for 8 basic emotions.
students in clinical psychology.
primary rater.

Raters were two graduate

The current author served as the

The second rater was used to evaluate the interrater
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reliability of the eight basic emotion rating scales.

The primary

rater coded all ERs while the second rater coded 150 of the EMs, or
approximately 62% of the sample (48 subjects X 5 EMs

= 240

EMs).

The emotions coding manual is a considerably revised version of
the manual developed by Wynne and Plutchik (1974).
is included here as Appendix D.

The revised manual

The primary revisions were as follows:

The original preface describing Plutchik's circumplex model of emotions was excluded;

subjective emotion terms describing combinations of

the eight basic emotions of the Plutchik model, obtained from Plutchik
(1980), were included; and finally, the scoring criteria were reorganized and amplified by information drawn from Plutchik (1980).
To present the occurrence of rater bias which would result in a
spurious confirmation of the circumplex model being evaluated, the
following procedures were adopted.
emotion at a time.
Appendix E).

The coders rated EMs for only one

The ratings were then placed on summary sheets (see

The order in which the eight basic emotions were coded

was randomized to prevent an order of rating effect (Guilford, 1954)
such that ratings adjacent in time would show greater inter-correlations.

Guilford argues this order of rating effect is sufficiently

strong to warrant consideration.

By randomizing the order of rating

and by rating only one emotion at a time, spurious inter-correlations
between emotions should be either minimized or created in such a way
that they would detract from the pattern sought in the data.
The eight emotions were rated using a 7-point scale. Zero indicated
the emotion was not present.

A score from 1 to 6 was used for inten-

sity of the emotion if it was judged present.

The verbal descriptions
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for intensity at each numerical weight were as follows:

1 =very

slightly, 2 = slightly, 3 = fairly, 4 = strongly, 5 = very strongly,
and 6 = extremely.
Reliability of the Scoring
In examining the inter-rater reliability for each emotion scale
several indices of agreement between the raters were computed.
first two indices indicated the raters' agreement on:

The

1) the presence

versus absence of the emotion, and 2) disagreement on the rated intensity of the emotion larger than 3 scale points.

The final index,

a Pearson E.• was computed on the final score made after re-rating of
initial scores disagreeing more than 3 scale points.

The steps in

this procedure were 1) familiarization with the emotion coding manual
and 2) rating of each EM for presence/absence and intensity.

Initial

ratings were then compared for rater agreement on each type of judgment (presence/absence and intensity).

When rater disagreements were

larger than 3 scale points, raters were so advised and asked to re-read
and re-score the EM.

Re-ratings were then combined with the appro-

priate initial ratings (i.e., unchanged ratings) and a Pearson correlation was computed to assess reliability between raters.
Table 4 presents the data on EM ratings for each emotion.

It

can be observed that final ratings were reasonably similar to one
another as assessed by the correlation coefficients.

Table 4 also

suggests that several of the emotions were more difficult to score.
The emotion of "expectancy" showed initial disagreements on the
present/absent judgment 19% of the time.
for disgust.

A similar score occurred

However, anger, fear, sadness, and acceptance achieved
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Table 4
Reliability Scores for the Emotion Rating

Pearson r*

Disagreements
on Presence vs.
Absence **

Disagreements
Larger Than
3 Scale Points**

Anger

.92

2.6%

0%

Fear

.91

8.6%

2%

Happy

.85

14.6%

3%

Sad

.92

8.6%

2.6%

Expect

.80

19.0%

30.5%

Surprise

.83

16.0%

14. 61~

Accept

.86

4.0%

10.0%

Disgust

.97

19.0%

30.0%

Average

.88

11.5%

11.6%

Emotion

*These scores were computed after consultation.
**These scores were computed prior to consultation, and were
calculated by the following formula: index scores/150, e.g., for
anger, there were 4 disagreements on the present or absent
judgment and therefore 4/150 = 2.6%.
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fairly high levels of initial agreement for both the presence/absence
and intensity judgments.

The final inter-rater correlations for the

more difficult to code emotions are also lower than for the easier
emotions indicating that re-rating did not entirely alleviate the
difficulty of the scoring process.

However, all final ratings achieved

a minimum inter-rater reliability coefficient of .80 and, therefore,
the rating process was considered sufficiently reliable to warrant
the use of the ratings for subsequent analysis.
Validity of the Scoring System
Two aspects of the validity of the scoring system are addressed:
(1) the degree of circumplexity (and the specific similarity/polarity
relations) between each of the emotions, and (2) the validity of the
assumption that eight distinct emotions are being scored by the
system.
At this point in the analysis of the data the distinctness of
the eight emotions is the paramount issue.

To provide an empirical

assessment of this a principal components analysis of the ratings
was done through SPSS-X.

An average emotion score was used for this

analysis since there are relatively few subjects in the present sample
though it should be noted that there are six for each emotion.

Thus,

each subject provided one emotion score (the average across all five
EMs) for each of the eight emotions.
were intercorrelated.

These scores for all subjects

The resulting matrix was submitted to a prin-

cipal components analysis with the number of factors to be extracted
set at eight.

The factors extracted were then rotated to a "simple

structure" solution using a varimax rotation and a Kaiser
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normalization.

This type of rotation attempts to load only one var-

iable highly on a factor while reducing the loadings of all other
variables to the minimum possible.

If this is achieved, a "simple

structure" is obtained which indicates the degree to which each variable may be considered a distinct "factor" underlying the variation
in the data.
Table 5 presents the rotated factor matrix for the averaged
emotion scores.

It can be seen that each emotion variable does,

indeed, load highly on only one factor.

The second highest loading

of a variable on a factor (for all factors) never exceeds .20, indicating simple structure was achieved.

Thus, the rating system appears

to be measuring the presence of eight distinct emotions in ERs.
A careful inspection of the factors in terms of the most positive
and most negative loadings (i.e., polarity) also indicates where
deviations from Plutchik's (1980) circumplex model are occurring.
However, an analysis of the circumplexity of the emotions will be
reserved for the discussion in the Results section.

There the extent

of circumplexity as assessed by the Wiggins et al. (1981) method using
the estimated rho's will be complemented by the current principal
components analysis done on the raw data.
Identifying "Screen Memories"
Freud (1901/1965: Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982) used four
criteria to identify "screen memories":

1) they were affectively

"neutral" or lacked emotional tone; 2) they were repetitively
recalled spontaneously; 3) they were predominantly visual in sensory
imagery; and 4) the rememberer was able to observe him- or herself

Table 5
The Rotated Factor Matrix of the Principal Components in Emotion Scores

Variable

2

1

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Factor 5

Factor 6

Surprise

• 97261

.09782

.05422

.03429

-.01346

Sadness

.09972

. 96546

. 07706

.02426

Anger

.05482

.07658

. 96972

Acceptance

.03489

.02424

Joy

-.01375

Disgust
Fear
Anticipate

Factor 7

Factor 8

-.01832

.16425

- .11334

-.01321

.10303

.07289

-.18791

.99395

-.19827

.07427

.02345

-.07338

.00376

• 96250

.15134

-.15835

-.11111

.10701

-.01382

-.20839

.15510

.95462

-.94643

.00120

.13671

-.01986

.10809

.07891

-.16401

- .04 775

.95035

.19925

.06427

.17573

.97423

.02380

-.11420

.00146

.19838

.95211

.06427

-.12292

-.20169

-.07941

.11382

.14207

-.09917

.06541

.94375

1
,N=48. The data were averaged emotion scores (across five early memories) for each subject. The
emotion scores were intercorrelated and the resulting matrix was submitted to a principal components
analysis. The extracted components were then rotated using a varimax procedure with a Kaiser
normalization. The procedure was done with SPSS-X.
2

The sequence of emotions in this column is not Plutchik's (see Figure 2), but rather is that given
in the computer output for the sake of convenience.
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in the memory image.

The EMFRs inquire about these features of EMs.

Using all four criteria, 50% of the total sample of subjects failed
to recall a "screen memory."

However, 18 subjects recalled 1, 5 sub-

jects recalled 2, and 1 subject recalled 3 "screen memories."

Thus,

while "screen memories" did not comprise a large percentage of the EMs
recalled (12.9% of all EMs), there were enough for subsequent analysis,
i.e., their relation to the emotion variables in the current study.
Identifying "Traumatic Memories"
The criteria for identifying
simple.

traumatic memories was quite

EMs containing any reference to the following themes were

scored as traumatic:

bodily injury, severe grief, loss of loved

ones, violations of normative expectations (regarding love, intimacy,
and friendship), death, and violence.

An example of a violation of a

normative expectation regarding love is:

A subject reported an EM of

when his mother had been away from home vacationing for a period of
time.

When she returned home he was sitting on the front steps of

his house with his sister.

He saw her get out of his father's car.

He jumped over his sister and ran to her.

She refused to hug or kiss

him and rebuked him for not helping his younger sister approach the
car with him.

He recalled feeling shamed and saddened.

Two raters coded all EMs and made a judgment as to whether the
memory was traumatic.

Both raters agreed that 150 memories were not

traumatic, that 64 were traumatic, and disagreed on the presence of
trauma in 26 EMs.
214/240

Thus, overall raters agreed 89% of the time (i.e.,

= 89%) on the presence of trauma in the EMs.
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Statistical Analysis
Statistical analysis of the data in terms of its circumplexity
was achieved using the Fortran IV program developed by James Steiger
(Wiggins et al., 1981) entitled MULTICORR Version 2.

This program is

generalized for the detection of "pattern" in correlation matrices
with magnitudes up to 21.

The parameters of the program were set at

values conforming to the logic of circumplex structure in an 8 x 8
matrix.

The principal components, eigenvalues and eigenvectors,

and Mean-Squared Residual were computed by calculator from the programs output (i.e., the rho-estimate) using the formulas supplied in
Wiggins et al. (1981).

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Discussion of the results is organized around five aspects of
the data:

1) the "survey" characteristics of EMs; 2) the relation

between the "state" (POMS-B) and "trait" (EPI) measures of emotion
or mood; 3) the relation between emotions experienced by subjects
("state" and "trait") and emotions rated in EMs; and 5) evidence for
circumplexity between emotions rated in EMs.
The "Survey" Characteristics of EMs
Table 6 presents the data collected on the content features of
EMs.

The figures in the table refer to the percentage of EMs sub-

jects rated as having the content feature.
males, females, and the combined sample.

Figures are given for
Also included in column 4

are the comparable figures obtained by Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz
(1982) with the college-age portion of their sample.
A striking feature of Table 6 is the similarity between the
figures obtained with the two independent samples of subjects in the
two studies.

It would appear that the general content features of

EMs are very similar for this subject age group.
There was only one statistically significant sex difference.
Females stated they could observe themselves in their memory imagery
for 73.3% of their EMs.

Males only rated 48.5% of their EMs as
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Table 6
Content Features of Early Memories and Characteristics
of the Subject Sample

Subject Characteristics
Feature

Men

Women

Combined

fl of Subject

14

34

48

Mean Age

19

18.4

18.7

SD

Total Number of
Early Memories

.95

1.4

70

170

Kihlstrom and
Harackiewicza

164

1.12

240

164

Percentage of Early Memories with Content Feature
Clarity of Memoryc
cloudy
clear
vivid

23
46
31

22
55
22

22.5
52.3
24.6

24

25

24.5

24.7
44.3
31.0

Frequency of Prior
Recall of Memoryc
just now
occasionally
before
frequently
before

57

60

59.5

69.6

18.5

15

15.8

24.1

Affective Rating
of Memoryc
Pleasant
Neutral
Unpleasant

35.7
22.8
41.4

36.4
25.3
38.2

36.25
24.6
39.2

43.0
29.7
27.2

Visual Presence of
Self in Memoryc

48.5

73.3

66.3

58.1

Memory in Colorc

71.4

74

73.5

71.0

Memory Achromaticc

24.3

26

25.6

29.0
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Table 6 (continued)
Percentage of Early Memories with Content Feature
Feature

Men

Women

Combined

Kihlstrom and
Harackiewicza

Sensory Qualities Judged
c
Present in Memory Imagery
visual
auditory
olfactory
tactile
kinesthetic
gustatory

98.5
31.4
15.7
38.6
41. 7
5.7

94.4
47.7
7.6
35.8
47.6
7.0

99.1
42.5
10.0
36.6
45.8
6.7

98.1
32.9
10.8
42.2
54.4
2.5

Memories Meeting Criteria
for Freudian Screen
Memoriesd

7.1

15.2

12.9

26.5

28.6

27.0

Judged to Possess
Trauma Contentd

26.7

Judgment of Age At Which
Event Occurredc
Mean (Years)
SD
(Years)
Range (Weeks and
Years)

6.0
1.4
3-11 yrs.

5.2
1.4
7 wks18 yrs.

5.6
1.4

3.91
1.26

aData in this column obtained from Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz (1982,
Table 1). Missing entries indicate lack of comparable data.
bKihlstrom & Harackiewicz (1982) scored any early memories with 3 of
Freud's 4 criteria as a "screen memory." Therefore, their data on
this content features are not identical to those of the present
study. However, an intercorrelation (with the current subjects) of
all four features in early memories showed that they were highly
correlated with one another at statistically significant levels.
Therefore, the data from the two studies may be generally if not
strictly comparable.
cSubjects judged this content feature.
dThe experimenter judged this feature. For "screen memories" it was
based entirely on ratings or judgments provided by the subject.
The "trauma" feature was judged by the investigator alone.
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having this feature.
ficant.

The difference (.!:,(

46

)

=

2.80, .E. <.01) is signi-

More will be said about this difference when "screen memor-

ies" are discussed later since the "self-seen" variable is related to
the former as well.
As a combined group the subjects rated 76.9% of the EMs as
either "clear" or "vivid."

Only 22.5% of them were rated as "cloudy."

Over 73% of them were rated as having color imagery.

And visual,

auditory, and kinesthetic sensory imagery predominated in the entire
sample.

Finally, 75.3% of the EMs were rated as having been either

"occasionally" or "frequently" recalled before the experiment.

Thus,

it appears that subjects find their EMs to be quite clear and memorable.
The ratio of "pleasant" to "unpleasant" EMs was approximately 1.
This ratio is different from that reported by previous investigators
(Dudycha & Dudycha, 1933, 1941; Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982;
Walfogel, 1948) who report a ratio closer to 2:1.
Twenty-seven (27%) percent of the EMs were rated by the investigators as having "traumatic content."

This figure accords well

with the data obtained by Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) who obtained a percentage of 26.6.

This figure is also close to the per-

centage rated as "unpleasant" by the subjects.
The average age of the EMs as rated by subjects was 5.6 years.
The women reported a much larger range of dates for their EMs than
did the men.

Walfogel (1948) reports the same phenomena.

average, then, the EMs studied here are 13 years old.

On the
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The Emotional Characteristics of EMs
Subjects were asked to rate the affective qualities of their
EMs in a global way as either "pleasant," "neutral," or "unpleasant"
in overall affective tone.

However, since the investigators rated

each EM for the presence and intensity of the eight basic EPI emotions it is possible to more finely assess the emotional qualities of
the memories.
Table 7 presents the data collected on all of the emotion
variables studied:

EPI emotions, EM-rated emotions, and the POMS-B

Elation-Depression scores assessing the current mood-state of the
subjects.

Four sununary emotion scores are also introduced in this

table for both the eight emotions in the EPI and in the EMs:

Sum

Positive Emotions (the simple sum of the acceptance, joy, and expectancy scores);

Sum Negative Emotions (the simple sum of the fear,

anger, surprise, disgust, and sadness scores);
simple sum of all eight emotions scores);

Total Emotion (the

and Sum Positive/Total

Emotion (the ratio of the three positive emotion scores to the five
negative emotion scores).

A fifth sununary score was developed based

on the subjects' affective ratings of EMs.

"Pleasant," "neutral," and

"unpleasant" subjects' ratings were assigned scores of 3, 2, and 1,
respectively, and the average ratings across the 5 EMs per subject
were called the Mean EM Affect score.
The mean POMS-B Elation-Depression score for the entire sample
was 46.40 (SD= 9.99).

This is a normative standardized t-score (i.e.,

mean = 50, SD = 10) so the present sample is neither very elated nor
depressed as a group.

Males had a mean of 44.38 (SD= 9.76) and
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Emotion Variables:

Emotions

Profile Index (EPI), Profile of Mood States Bipolar Form ElationDepression Scale (POMS-B), Emotion Rateda in Early Memories
(EM Emotion), and the Emotion Summary Scores

= 48

Mean

Standard Deviation

46.40

9.99

20.94
16.40
19.06
7.23
8.02
5.40
10.98
15.81
56.23
36.30
92.31
.61

4.74
4.10
4.78
4.84
4.53
3.98
3.97
4. 72
7.31
7.60
4.33
.08

Acceptance
Joy
Anger
Disgust
Sadness
Surprise
Fear
Sum Positive~
Sum Negative
Total Emotionef
Sum Pos./Total

1.58
1.35
.88
.53
.88
2.20
1.53
3.98
6.00
9.96
.41

.81
.90
.92
.66
.81
.95
.90
1.81
2.48
2.53
.16

Mean EM Affecth

2.01

.40

N

POMS-Bi

EPI Emotion

b

Acceptance
Joy
Anticipation
Anger
Disgust
Sadness
Surprise
Fear
Sum Positive~
Sum Negative
Total Emotionef
Sum Pos./Total
EM Emotiong
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Table 7 (continued)

NOTES: :The investigators rated emotions in EMs.
The EPI raw score (Raw Score Range: 0-29) means and SD are
reported.
c
dThe sum of acceptance, joy, and anticipation scores.
The sum of anger, disgust, sadness, surprise, and fear scores.
~The sum of all 8 emotion scores.
The ratio of the Sum Positive and Total Emotion scores.
gEmotions rated on a 7-point scale: 0 = absent, 1-2 = low
hintensity, 3-4 =moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity.
The subject global affective ratings of "pleasant," "neutral,"
and "unpleasant" were assigned scores of 3, 2, 1, respectively
and the mean score across the 5 EMs each subject recalled and
.rated =Mean EM Affect score.
1
The POMS-B mean is reported as a t-score.
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females of 4 5. 85 (SD

13.59).

The difference between the means is

not significant.
The most intense emotions in EMs were acceptance, joy, surprise,
and fear.

This accords with the findings of Dudycha and Dudycha (1933,

1941) and Walfogel (1948) who both found fear to be the most common
negative emotion in EMs; and joy to the most prevalent positive
emotion.

Table 8 lists the average number of EMs per subject in which

an emotion was identified.

The most intense EPI emotions were accep-

tance, joy, fear, and anticipation.

This suggests some degree of

correspondence between the two types of emotion measures, so to
better assess this EM-emotions and EPI-emotions were intercorrelated.
Table 9 presents the intercorrelation matrix.

Also included in the

table are the POMS-B and Mean EM Affect scores.

Of the 81 correla-

tions between EM-emotion and EPI-emotion scores only three are significant:

EM-acceptance and EPI-fear (.!:_

=

.37, E. <.01) and EPI-anger

(.!:_ = - • 30, .£ <. 05); and EM-disgust and EPI-acceptance (.!:_ = • 31, .£ <. 05) •

It appears that even though the mean scores for the EPI and EM emotions are proportionately similar, there is almost no linear relation
between the two types of measures.
There are, however, two patterns of correlations in Table 9
which merit interest.

The POMS-B and EPI-emotion scales show several

sensible and significant correlations.
are positively correlated (.!:_

=

The POMS-B and EPI-joy scale

.36, .£ <.05), while the POMS-B corre-

lates negatively with EPI-anger (.!:_ = -.30,
(.!:_

= -.40, .£ <.01).

and the POMS-B (E_

=

E.

<.05) and EPI-sadness

The positive correlation between EPI-surprise
.32, .£ <.05) is unexpected, though, since it is
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Table 8
Average Number of Early Memories Per Subject in Which
an Emotion Was Identified

Mean

SD

Anger

1.48

1.21

Fear

2.59

1.10

Surprise

3.30

1.08

Expectation

2.65

1.20

.80

.93

Acceptance

2.70

1.15

Joy

2.17

1.09

Sadness

1.53

1.06

Disgust

NOTE:

N_

= 48.

Five early memories per subject.

Table 9
Intercorrelation Matrix of Emotions Profile Index Scales, Emotions Rateda in Early Memories, the
Profile of Mood States Bipolar Form Elation-Depression Scale, and the Mean EM Affect Scoreb

EMOTIONS RATED IN EARLY MEMORIES
Accept
(1)

Fear
(2)

Surprise

Anger
(6)

Anticip.
(7)

.24

.07

.26

.31*

-.05

.05

.16

-.01

-.04

-.06

.09

-.04

.01

-.002

-.09

.01

.13

.05

.04

-.14

-.15

.01

(3)

Sad
(4)

Disgust
(5)

Accept

(1)

.14

Fear

(2)

.37**

Surprise

(3)

-.28

Sad

(4)

-.11

-.11

.03

.07

-.14

.07

Disgust

(5)

-.14

-.07

.07

-.15

-.26

-.02

Anger

(6)

-.30*

-.10

.11

.22

-.01

Anticipation

(7)

.11

-.08

-.07

-.22

Joy

(8)

.14

.05

.02

POMS-B E-Dc

(9)

.06

.oo

.06

Mean EM Aff d (10)

.24

-.36*

-.37**

.002

Joy
(8)

Mean
POMSc EM Aff. d

.28

.06

-.13

-.06

.32*

.02

-.40**

.07

-.005

-.01

-.06

-.16

.27

-.14

-.12

-.30*

-.12

-.11

-.11

-.07

-.13

.10

-.11

.13

.23

-.04

.02

.10

.00

.10

-.08

.10

-.16

-.27

-.15

-.32*

.26

.61***

.36*

.21
.07

Table 9 (continued)

aThe investigators rated the emotions in early memories.
bThe mean EM Affect score is derived from subjects' global ratings of their EMs as "pleasant," "neutral,"
and "unpleasant." Each rating was assigned a score of 3, 2, 1, respectively, and the average across
the 5 EMs = Mean Affect Score.
cThe Profile of Mood States Bipolar Form Elation-Depression Scale.
dThe Mean EM Affect Score;

*.E. <.05
**.E. <.01
***p <.0001

see Note b.
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considered a negative emotion by Plutchik (1980).
The relations between the Mean EM Affect score and EM-emotions
are interesting insofar as they probably indicate the more specific
bases for the subjects' global EM affective ratings.

Thus, the Mean

EM Affect score correlates positively with EM-rated joy (!_
< .0001), and negatively with EM-rated joy (!_
prise (!_

= -.37, .E. <.01), and anger

(!_

= -.36,

=

.61, .E.

.E. <.05), sur-

= -.32, .E. <.05).

This

supports the impression gained from the means in Table 6 that the
emotions of fear, joy, and surprise are predominant as emotional
features of the EMs.

In addition, surprise does appear to be a

negative emotion in the context of EMs since it is significantly and
negatively correlated with subjects' global affective ratings of the
pleasantness of the memories.
The Relation Between EM-Rated Emotions and Subjects' Three Global
Affective Ratings of the Memories
The investigators rated the eight emotions in EMs.

The subject's

3 global affective judgments of "pleasant," "neutral," and "unpleasant"
were correlated with the investigator's ratings of the presence and
intensity of the 8 emotions.

TablelOpresents the correlation matrix.

The figures refer to the number of EMs each subject rated for each
global affect category and the investigator's emotion intensity
ratings for the EMs (summed across the 5 EMs) for each subject.
The pattern of results indicates the investigator's more
specific emotion ratings show systematic and sensible relations with
the subject's more global affect judgments.

If we assume that each

specific emotion formed the basis for the global subject's judgments,
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Table 10
The Relation Between the Investigator's Ratings of Eight Emotions in
Early Memories and Subjects' More Global Affective Judgments of
Them as "Pleasant," "Neutral," and "Unpleasant"a

Experimenter
Rated Emotions
in Early Memories

Subject's Global Affect Ratings
of the Early Memories
"Pleasant"

"Neutral"

Anger

-.30*

.13

Fear

-.21

-.25

.49***

Surprise

-.29*

-.05

.42**

Disgust

-.17

.15

.09

Sadness

-.31*

.23

.16

"Unpleasant"

.28*

Joy

.66****

-.41**

-.46**

Expectancy

.33*

-.32*

-.13

Acceptance

.34*

-.42**

.07

.64****

-.53****

Sum Positivea
.

Sum Negat1ve

b

Total Emotionc
Sum Pos/Totald

-.44**
.02
.70****

.05
-.34*
-.41**

-.34*
.51****
.26
-.52****

aThe correlations are between the number of early memories (of 5)
subjects rated in each affect category and the investigator's
intensity ratings for each emotion averaged across the 5 memories
for each subject.

*.£.

<.05

**.£. <.01
***.£. <.001
****.£. <.0001
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then the following conclusions can be made.

Subject's judgments of

an EM as "pleasant" are based on the presence of higher levels of the
three positive emotions of joy (.!:_ = .66,
.34, E <.02), and expectancy (E_ = .33,

E.

E.

<.0001), acceptance (.!:_ =

<.02).

They are also based

on lower intensities of the three negative emotions of anger (E_ = -.30,

E. <.03), surprise (.!:_

-.29, E. <.05), and sadness (.!:_ = -.31, E. <.03).

Subjects' global affective ratings of an EM as "neutral" appear
to be based on the presence of lower intensities of the emotions of
joy (.!:_ = -.41, E. <.004), acceptance (.!:_ = -.42, E. <.003), and expectancy (.!:_ = -.32,

E.

.025).

Finally, lower intensities of fear (.!:_ =

-.25, E. <.08) are probably related to this judgment since its presence
at a higher intensity might alter the subject's judgments from
"neutral" to "unpleasant" in overall affective-tone.
The subject's judgment of EMs as "unpleasant" appears related
to the presence of high intensities of the negative emotions of anger
(.!:_ = .28, E. <.056), fear (E_ = .49, E. <.001), and surprise (E_ = .42, E.
<

.003).

Similarly, it is based on the presence of very low inten-

sities of emotion of joy(.!:_= -.46,

E.

<.001).

It seems sensible to conclude that the investigator's ratings
of the specific emotions in EMs show strong relationships with the
subject's more global affective judgments of EMs.

Additionally,

Plutchik's (1980) assessment of surprise as a negative emotion is
again borne out by the EM data.

Finally, global affective judgments,

while valid, must also be seen as obscuring more specific relations
between discrete emotions and the affective quality of an experience.
The two independent measures appear to provide complementary, but not
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identical information regarding the affective qualities of an individual's remembered experience.
"Screen Memories" and the "Self-Seen" Variable
When EMs are identified as "screen memories" using all four of
Freud's criteria, 12.9% were observed.

When only the presence of self

in EM imgaery (the "self-seen" variable) is considered, 66.3% are
identified.

Females rated a larger proportion of their EMs as having

this variable (73.3%) than did the males (48.5%).
The frequency of screen memories reported by subjects was
correlated with all EPI emotion scales including four summary variables:

Sum Positive Emotions (acceptance, joy, and expectancy), Sum

Negative Emotions (anger, fear, surprise, disgust, and sadness), Total
Emotion (sum of all 8 emotions), and Sum Positive/Total Emotion.
These summary emotion variables are conceptually distinct.

Sum Pos-

itive and Sum Negative index the characteristic intensity with which
subjects experience the positive and negative emotions, respectively.
These variables increase as subjects' characteristic intensity level
for each emotion increases.

The Sum Positive/Total Emotion indexes

the relative balance of intensities of positive emotions to all emotions.

And the Total Emotion variable indexes the subjects' charac-

teristic emotion intensity irrespective of what quality or valence
the emotion may have (Plutchik, 1980).

As such, it indexes the

individual difference variable of how intensely the subject experiences emotion per se.
Several of the EPI emotion variables correlated significantly
with the frequency of "screen memories."

Specifically:

Acceptance
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(.!: = -.27, E. <.06), Sadness (.!: = .31, E. <.05), Anger (.!: = -.27, E.

<

.03), Sum Negative Emotion (.!: = .32, E. <.05), and Sum Positive/Total
Emotion (.!: = -.30, E. <.05).
Since one of the criteria for a screen memory is that the subject
rate it as being neutral in overall affective tone, it was decided
to correlate such memories with emotion rated in EMs by the investigator.

When this was done, the following significant correlations

resulted.

Specifically,

EM-Emotions

[Acceptance(.!:= -.32, E. <.05),

and Sum Positive Emotion (same as in EPI)(.!: = -.36, E. <.01)) were
related to the frequency with which subjects recalled screen memories.
Since the EPI measures "trait" levels of characteristically
experienced emotions and the EM-emotion measures the emotional characteristics within the sample of EMs, the following sununarization of
the observed relations is warranted.

Individuals who report higher

levels of negative affect and lower levels of the emotion of acceptance
both in their current lives and in their autobiographical memories
also show a higher incidence of screen memories.
Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) found the personality "trait
of harm-avoidance" (measured by the Jackson Personality Inventory)
predicted the occurrence of screen memories in their sample.

Harm-

avoidance is considered a characteristic tendency to avoid anxietyprovoking situations.

"Anxiety" is a somewhat vague and general term

for what can more precisely be measured as combinations of fear and
(two or more of the following) anger, shame, guilt, and interest/
excitement (Izard, 1972, 1977).

The findings of Kihlstrom and

Harackiewicz (1982) can be related to the present results if the
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following assumption is made. High levels of negative emotions (EPI
fear, anger, sadness, surprise, and disgust) and low levels of
acceptance are in a general way equivalent to anxiety.

In other words,

the two studies are measuring anxiety but in different ways.
There is no conceptual difficulty in equating a high EPI Sum
Negative Emotions score with anxiety since Izard (1972) has shown
that the latter can be more finely differentiated into the emotions
of fear, anger, and sadness.

A low EPI acceptance score also is

related to anxiety when the specific qualities of this emotion are
considered.

Plutchik (1980) defines and measures the emotion of

acceptance at several levels of analysis.
feelings it is equated with

At the level of subjective

the affective "states" of "calmness,"

"agreeableness," "contentment" and "warmth."

At the behavioral level

it is equated with tendencies toward "approach" and "affiliation."
It should be clear that anxiety is in some sense the opposite of the
subjective and behavioral referents of "acceptance" as it is conceptualized and measured in the EPI.

Thus, it is very likely that the

current results complement those of Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982).
In addition to complementing the results of the previous study,
however, the present results also extend them in a very important way;
i.e., they provide a more direct type of evidence for Freud's conceptualization of the psychological meaning of screen memories than is
provided by the previous study.

Freud (1901/1965) believed that such

memories implied an ongoing conflictual process in the rememberer both
at the level of past and current experience.

The memory was believed

to be of the past conflictual event (i.e., a "traumatic Oedipal
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experience").

The current conflict was believed to be represented by

the "screening" of the original memory content by more innocuous and
less anxiety-provoking detail devoid of emotional-tone.

Another

measure of the conflictual process was that such memories were repetitively recalled despite their apparently banal content.

The final

indicator was the imaginative elaboration of the memory content such
that the subjects could "observe the self" in the memory imagery.

This

last was direct evidence that the original memory content had been
altered in some way.
The present study provides more direct evidence for Freud's
hypothesis because the emotional qualities of the memories themselves
were measured.

Thus, high levels of negative emotions (Sum Negative

Emotions) and low levels of acceptance in both the trait instrument
(the EPI) and in the memories themselves correlated with the frequency of reporting screen memories.

Of course, the present results

do not address Freud's hypothesis about the nature of "Oedipal
traumas" as the ultimate basis for screen memories.
Trauma Memories
Twenty-six (26%) percent of all EMs were rated as having traumatic content.

Two questions were considered.

First, are trauma

memories rated by subjects as being more frequently recalled than nontraumatic memories; and second, did such memories show a relationship
to either trait (EPI) or "state" (POMS-B) emotion?

A major diagnostic

sign of stress and trauma-related pathology is the occurrence of intrusive, repetitive imagery (i.e., memories) of the traumatic event
accompanied by intense dysphoric and anxious affect.

Of course, such
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severe symptoms were not expected for EMs, but rather the question was
whether there might be any similarity at all.
Subjects' judgments of the extent of previous recall of each
EM was compared for the trauma and the non-trauma meories.

The

proportion of each type of EM in each recall category ("just now,"
"occasionally before," and "frequently before") was tabulated.

The

proportion of traumatic EMs in each category of recall frequency is:
Now= .25, Occasionally Before= .564, and Frequently Before= .187.
For non-traumatic EMs it is:
and Frequently Before = .166.

Now = .268, Occasionally Before = .566,
The differences between proportions

for each type of memory was examined using a
Fruchter, 1978).

~-test

(Guilford &

All three tests were non-significant.

Similarly,

the correlation between incidence of traumatic EMs and state (POMS-B,
Elation-Depression) and trait (EPI Sum Positive/Total Affect scales)
emotions across subjects produced no significant correlations.
Mood-Dependent Recall of Early Memories
Several analyses were conducted of the relation between the mood
state of subjects and the rated (by subject) affective quality of EMs.
These analyses correspond to Hypotheses 1-5 presented earlier.
The first issue examined was whether there was an overall interaction between mood states and EM affective quality as is predicted
by Bower (1981).

In other words, can MDR be observed regardless of

the intensity level of the mood state of subjects.
The categorization of subjects as "happy," "neutral," and "sad"
was made on the basis of the sample mean on the POMS-B ElationDepression scale (mean= 46.9, SD= 9.9).

Subjects with scores one
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standard deviation (SD) above the sample mean were considered "happy."
"Neutral" subjects scored within one sd either side of the mean, and
"sad" subjects scored below one sd from the sample mean.

Neither

the happy or sad subjects are normatively (i.e., POMS-B standardization data) either very happy or very depressed.
Table 11 presents a breakdown of subjects' rated affective
quality of EMs (positive, neutral, negative) by current mood state of
subject (happy, neutral, sad).

The mean percentage of the 5 EMs

recalled by each subject mood group in each EM affect category is
tabulated.

It can be seen that the happy subject recalled the largest

percentage of happy EMs and the lowest percentage of sad EMs.

However,

sad and neutral subjects recalled approximately the same percentages
of happy, neutral, and sad EMs.

Thus, upon initial inspection of the

data there appears to be an asymmetric MDR effect when the entire
subject sample is considered.

When a one-way ANOVA was conducted on

the percentage of EMs rated as happy by each mood group, a non-significant

!.

[!_( ,

2 45

)

= 1.68, ns.) was obtained.

Thus, the asymmetric MDR

pattern is non-reliable in terms of the group data.
A second statistical analysis was conducted that examined the
linear relations between subjects' mood states and the affective qualities of EMs.

The mean affect scores and the number of EMs rated

positive, neutral, and negative by subjects were correlated with subject's POMS-B Elation-Depression score.

Table 12 presents these

statistics for males and females separately and as a group.
the correlations reached statistical significance.

None of

A trend was ob-

served, however, for the more "elated" males to rate fewer numbers of
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Table 11
Subject Mood Statea and Subject Ratings of the Affective qualityb
of Their Early Memories:
for Each Mood State Group

Mean Percentage c of Early Memories
d

Subject's Affect Ratings of Memories
Mood Groups

Positive

Neutral

Negative

Happy (B_ = 9)

51.0%

20.0%

28.8%

"Neutral" (B_ = 21)

31.0%

26.6%

41.9%

Sad (B_ = 18)

37.7%

24.4%

37.7%

aSubject mood assessed by the Profile of Mood State Bipolar Form
Elation-Depression scale (POMS-B, E-D).
bSubjects rated their early memories as being either positive, neutral
or negative in overall affective tone.
cThere were a total of 240 early memories.
early memories.
d

The POMS-B, E-D mean
The happy mood group
"neutral" mood group
below at or below 42

Each subject recalled 5

score for the entire sample was 46.9 (SD= 9.9).
scored above 57 on the POMS-B, E-D scale. The
scored between 43-56, and the sad group scored
on this scale.

88

Table 12
Correlations Between Subject's Mood Statea and Their Ratings of
Early Memories as Happy, Neutral, or Sad:

Comparisons for

Males, Females, and Total Sample

Men

Women

(! = 14)

(! = 34)

Combined

(!

= 48)

POMS-B, E-D
and
b
Mean EM Affect

.18

.05

.08

POMS-B, E-D
and
II EMs Happy c

.28

.06

.11

POMS-B, E-D
and
II EMs Neutralc
POMS-B, E-D
and
ti EMs Sade

-.006

-.003

-.11

-.02

-.02

~ood state as assessed by the Profile of Mood States Bipolar Form
Elation-Depression scale (POMS-B, E-D).
bThe mean affect score is derived from subject ratings. A positive
(happy) ratings was assigned a score of 3; a neutral rating was
assigned a score of 2; and a negative (sad) rating was assigned a
score of 1. The mean of these scores across 5 early memories constitutes the mean affect score for the subject.
cSubjects rated the early memory for this quality.
d

.£. <.10.

All other correlations non-significant.
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EMs as neutral in affective tone (POMS-B, Elation-Depression score
correlated with number of EMs rated as neutral by males, r

.E.

-.35,

< .10) •

A final analysis was conducted to test Hypothesis 5 that subject's mood intensity moderates the degree of MDR observed.

Careful

inspection of the "neutral mood group" in Table 11 suggests a subtle
trend for this group to show more EMs rated as sad and fewer EMs
rated as happy than the group which is identified as sadder.

In

effect they are doing the opposite of what one would expect.

Figure

5 graphs the data in Table 11 so this reversal for the moderates group
can be more readily seen.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the moderate mood-intensity group
might show a different type of recall pattern than the more extreme
mood-intensity groups.

The groups were defined as "happy," "neutral"

(moderate), and "sad" in Table 11 on the basis of the sample mean of the
POMS-B Elation-Depression scale.

An alternative method of categorizing

the mood groups is possible, however, because this instrument has
normative data which can be used for this purpose.
mean for this instrument is 50 with a sd

= 10

The population

scale points.

The

"happy" mood group in Table 11 has only 9 subjects so it was decided
not to further subdivide this group.
18 subjects.

However, the "sad" group has

It is possible to extract 11 subjects from this group

who have at or below a score of 36 which is 1.4 sd below the population mean for the POMS-B scale.

When "happy" and "sad" mood groups

are defined in this way the data in Table 13 is obtained.
Table 13 shows the mean proportion of EMs (out of a total of 5
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(51)
Happy Mood
50
(41)
40

% of

Early Memories

30

Sad Mood
(38)

(38)

"Neutral"
Mood
(31)

(28)

20
(20)
10

0

Sad

Neutral

Happy

Self-Rated Affective Quality of Memory

aThe variables presented here correspond with each variable
presented in Table 11.

Figure 5.

Graphic Presentation of Data in Table lla
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Table 13
Mean Differences in the Proportion of Early Memories Rated as
Positive and Negative by "Happy" and "Sad" Mood Groupsa:
"Moderate"

d

Mood Subjects Removed

Subject-Rated Affective Quality
Mood Group

Positive

SD

Negative

SD

Happy
(N=9)

.511

.03

.288

.04

1.57

8

Sad
(N=ll)

.400

.05

.327

.05

-.73

10

tb
df
c

.E.

5.24
18

t

df

c

.E.

.10
ns

-1.83
18

.001

.05

~ood groups defined by subject's score on the Profile of Mood States

Bipolar Form Elation-Depression Scale. Happy subjects scored at or
above a t-score of 57; the Sad subjects scored at or below a t-score
of 36. The normative population mean for the scale is a t-score of
50 (sd = 10).
b

.!_-test for matched samples.

cAll probability values are one-tailed for directional hypotheses.
dThe moderate group obtained t-scores between 37-55 on the mood
scale (see note a).
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EMs) each subject rated as positive and negative in overall affective
tone with subjects divided into "happy" and "sad" mood groups.

It

can be seen that happy subjects recalled more positive EMs than did
the sad subject group [.£(l )
8

= 5.14,

.E. <.001, one-tailed].

The sad

subjects also recalled more negative EMs than did the happy subjects
[.£(l )
8

= -.1.83,

.E. <.05, one-tailed].

There was also a statistical

trend for the happy subjects to recall a larger number of positive
than negative EMs [.£( )
8
samples].

= 1.57,

.E. < .10, one-tailed; _£-test for matched

However, there was a reversal for the sad mood group.

They

actually recalled more positive EMs than negative EMs though this
difference is probably not reliable since a statistical trend could
not be found when a matched-sample _£-test was conducted [.£(lO)

=

- • 73, ns.].
Thus, when subject's mood state was categorized as happy or sad
based on normative criteria rather than sample means, an asymmetric
pattern of MDR was observed.

When the small sample sizes (and the

statistical trend for the happy group) are considered, it is not
inconceivable to expect that a symmetric MDR pattern might be observed
with a slightly larger sample.

In any case, the present analysis

supports Hypothesis 5 without any qualification in at least one sense.
When the more extreme mood subjects are considered a more powerful
MDR effect can be observed.

This can be seen when the point-biserial

correlation coefficients corresponding to various _£-test values are
considered.
!pb

=

.396.

For a t-test score of 5.24, r b
-

-p

=

.776; and for -1.83,

Both correlations exceed the magnitude of the correla-

tions observed when less extreme mood groups were compared in earlier

r
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statistical analyses.
Circumplexity Structure of Emotions in EMs
Tables 14-18 present the correlation matrices for the eight EPI
emotions rated in EMs by the investigator.

Table 19 is the correla-

tion matrix for the sununed emotion scores (i.e., the average intensity rating for each emotion across all 5 EMs) for each subject.
Table 20 presents the GLS rho-estimates generated by J. Steiger's
MULTICORR 2 for each matrix.
on the following:

Also included in the last table are data

chi-square goodness-of-fit test between the empir-

ical matrix and the rho-matrix; the mean square residual (MSR) between
the rho and empirical matrices; the variance of the rho's; percentage
of variance from the empirical matrices utilized in the circumplex
analysis (see Appendix F); and the Wilson-Hilferty

& Hilferty, 1931) which transforms
freedom into a

~-score

x2 s

~-score

(Wilson

with variable degrees of

with 1 df to allow comparison across analyses.

Table 21 presents the principal components extracted from the rho
matrices (Wiggins, et al., 1981) in terms of the variance in the
matrices which can be attributed to each type of principal component.
Table 20 and 21 can be used to assist visual inspection of circumplexi ty in Tables 14-18.
Inspection of Tables 14-18 reveals that the clearest degree of
circumplexity occurs in Table 18 for EM 5 the last memory recalled by
each subject.

Recall that we are seeking a pattern of correlations

in each successive minor diagonal that is initially positive, then
zero-order, then negative, then more highly negative (see Table 3).
There are departures from this pattern in Table 18 especially for the
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Table 14
a b c

Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 1 ' '

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Joy

(1)

Accept

(2)

Fear

(3) -2587

-3138

Surprise

(4) -1461

-0890

1618

Sad

(5) -0184

-2367

3336

3826

Disgust

(6) -2255

-1742

1825

0021

3234

Anger

(7) -1516

-0373

0122

0507

2203

0849

2185

-2501

-1466

-1786

-2104

Anticipate (8)

(7)

4144

1238

1078

aDecimals are ommitted from the table.
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using an 0-6
scale of intensity. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 =
moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity.
CN

= 48.

(8)
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Table 15
ab c
Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 2 ' '

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Joy

(1)

Accept

(2)

Fear

(3) -4315

-1666

Surprise

(4) -0538

0473

1605

Sad

(5) -1524

-1628

0284

1203

Disgust

(6) -0404

-2350

1367

-0351

0903

Anger

(7) -0116

0901

1553

2358

2888

2058

1172

-1998

-0484

-3794

-2371

Anticipate (8)

(7)

4940

0641

-2138

aDecimals are ommitted from the table.
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using a 0-6
scale of intensity. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 =
moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity.
CN

= 48.

(8)
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Table 16
ab c
Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 3 ' '

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Joy

(1)

Accept

(2)

Fear

(3) -3000

-2172

Surprise

(4) -3771

-1002

4990

Sad

(5) -3248

-0723

2435

0993

Disgust

(6) -1214

-1335

3980

1568

1099

Anger

(7) -4381

-2336

1031

0258

3794

2593

1464

-0776

-2942

-2218

0423

Anticipate (8)

(7)

3844

5226

-2670

aDecimals are ommitted from the table.
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using a 0-6
intensity scale. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 =
moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity.

CN

= 48.

(8)
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Table 17
Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 4a,b,c

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Joy

(1)

Accept

(2)

Fear

(3) -1401

-2686

Surprise

(4) -1543

-0313

3295

Sad

(5) -1911

-3106

-0295

2219

Disgust

(6) -2815

-1313

0763

1097

2341

Anger

(7) -4263

-3347

-0757

0120

2423

1041

-0188

0754

1277

-2056

-0538

Anticipate (8)

(7)

5409

1400

-1793

aThe decimals have been ommitted from the table.
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using a 0-6
intensity scale. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 =
moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity.

CN = 48.

(8)
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Table le
Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 5a,b,c

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Joy

(1)

Accept

(2)

Fear

(3) -5291

3005

Surprise

(4) -1408

-0690

2087

Sad

(5) -3238

-1737

1505

0278

Disgust

(6) -1939

-3085

1355

0591

4597

Anger

(7) -1362

-1493

-0268

1732

0260

2965

2766

-1530

-3482

-3334

-3428

Anticipate (8)

(7)

5057

3785

-2213

aDecimals are ommitted from the table.
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using an 0-6
scale of intensity. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 =
moderate intensity, 5 - 6 = high intensity.

CN

= 48.

(8)
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Table 19
Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in the Sununed Emotion
. b,c,d
Scores a For t h e Ear 1 y Memories

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Joy

(1)

Accept

(2)

Fear

(3) -0246

-2325

Surprise

(4) -0481

0408

3214

Sad

(5) -0703

0048

1622

2283

Disgust

(6) -1462

-3463

3979

0170

2362

Anger

(7) -4062

-0415

0702

1270

1803

1750

2314

0528

-2369

-3951

-2253

Anticipate (8)

(7)

(8)

3144

3080

-2030

aThe sununed emotions scores were the average intensity ratings for an
emotion across all 5 early memories per subject.
bThe deimals are ommitted from the table.
cThe emotions were rated by the investigator using an 0-6
intensity scale. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 =
moderate intensity, 5-6 =high intensity.
dN

= 48.
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Table 20
Generalized Least Square Estimates of the Rho Valuesa in the Intercorrelation Matrices For All Five Early Memories Separately And As
A Summed Variable:

Statistical Analysis of the Population Estimates

Early Memories
Parameter

1

2

3

5

4

Summed

Rho 1

1606

0941

1739

1402

2451

1400

Rho 2

0304

-0297

0165

-0436

0705

-0030

Rho 3

-1051

-0467

-0850

-1406

-1044

-0060

Rho 4

-0812

-0700

-1625

-1315

-3144

-1500

39.4

49.2

x2
df=24
Mean
Squared d
Residual
N

.025

f

48

71.36

48

.038
48

Variancea
of Rho's

f

Percent of
Varianceb

f

13.7%

f

-3.18

.0040

40.6

f

48
.0158

29.4%
.003

60.95

f

49.2

.024

.030

.0430

.0105

48

f

64%

25.9%

f

-1. 49

-3.18

aDecimal points are ommitted from the table of rho-estimates.
bPercentage of variance from the empirical matrix of correlations used
in the circumplex analysis. (See Appendix F for the rationale and
method of calculating this percentage.)
cWhile the same 48 subjects are used in all analyses, the "Sunnned"
variable consists of the average emotion intensity score across all
memories for each subject.
d

The mean squared residual is the mean of the squared deviations of
each empirical correlation from its corresponding rho-estimate.

101
Table 20 (continued)

eThe Wilson-Hilferty ~-score with 1 df.
fCircumplexity not present.

Therefore, statistics not calculated.
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Table 21
Proportion of Variance in the Principal Components Obtained Through
Circumplex Analysis of Emotion Scores Rateda in Early Memories Two,
.
Ear 1 y Memories
. b,c
Th ree, Five, an d Summe d Across All Five

Circumplex

General

Polarity

Orthogonality

Specificity

Early
Memory 2

31. 72

12.07

21. 77

24.74

9.70

Early
Memory 3

38.21

13.10

19.91

20.11

8.65

Early
Memory 5

45.21

13.85

20.51

13.61

6.81

Summed
Early
Memories

33.93

14.06

23.34

21.42

7.18625

SAMPLE

aThe investigator rated the presence and intensity of emotions in
memories.
bEarly memories one and four were not included since examination of
the ordinary least sqaures estimates of the rho values obtained
through MULTICORR indicated a lack of circumplexity. See Table 20.
c

~

= 48 for all analyses.
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following correlations:

minor diagonal one (sadness and surprise

.0278); minor diagonals two and six (see Table 3; these two diagonals
represent emotions separated by one other emotion on the circumplex)
show deviations for fear and joy (-.5291), anticipation and anger
(-.3428), and anticipation and acceptance (.2766);

minor diagonals

three and five show deviations for disgust and fear (.1355), and anger
and surprise (.1732);

finally, minor diagonal four which should show

only large negative correlations (if polarity is present and strong)
shows a deviation for anger and fear (-.0268).

Thus, 7 of the 28

correlations show a deviation from an exact circumplex pattern.

How-

ever, the remaining correlations do show the pattern indicative of
circumplexity and this can be demonstrated by the rho-estimates for
this matrix which are given in Table 17:
.0705, rho 3

rho 1

=

.2451, rho 2

=

= -.1044, and rho 4 = -.3144.

The MSR between the rho's and the empirical correlations in
Table 18 is .024 which indicates the rho's are on the average fairly
good estimates for each empirical correlation.

Table 20 also shows

that 64% of the variation in the empirical matrix was utilized in the
circumplex analysis (variance of the rho's/variance of the rho's plus
MSR

=

64%, see Appendix F).

Table 20 shows that 45.21% of the vari-

ation in the rho matrix for EM 5 can be attributed to circumplexity.
Thus, 28.9% of the empirical variation can be accounted for by circumplexity (64% x .4521

=

28.9).

The chi-square test recommended by Wiggins et al. (1982) is, as
they argued, an overly severe method for assessing the adequacy of a
circumplex model's fit to the empirical data.

This test assessed the
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degree of fit between the rho and empirical matrices.
between them increases the statistic.

Any deviations

For EM 5 the chi-square = 60.95

the largest observed with the present data.

Since EM 5 also produced

a clear circumplex structure (as indexed by the rho's, the principal
components analysis, the MRS, and the percentage of empirical variation attributable to circumplexity), some type of resolution of this
discrepancy must be considered.

EM 5 probably produced the largest

chi-square value because it is also the one with the largest absolute
value of the rho's and empirical correlations.

Therefore, the large

deviations observed for 7 of the empirical correlations from perfect
circumplexity (e.g., anger and fear= .0268 and is estimated by rho 4
= -.3144) are overly influencing the statistical test.

Since we are

less concerned with perfect circumplexity than with the degree of
observable circumplexity in the data, the statistic should probably
be given a relative weight in the interpretation of the results.
Table 20 and 21 show that while circumplexity was observable
in EM 2, 3, and the summed emotion scores, it is less evident than in
EM 5.

The most important figures to compare are the percent of

variance from the empirical matrix used in the circumplex analysis
(Table 20) with the degree of circumplexity (Table 21) in the rhoestimates.

These two values indicate that the following proportions

of empirical variation can be attributed to circumplexity in the respective analyses:
score= 8.78%.

EM 2 = 4.34%, EM 3 = 11.2%, and Summed Emotion

These are not large amounts of predictable variance.

However, they are not insignificant either.
Rosenthal (1984) has developed one method of dramatizing the
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significance of predictable variance that makes this last conclusion
clearer.

Rosenthal has constructed the "binomial effect size display"

(BESD) table to index the change in "success rate," "cure rate," etc.
achievable with the use of any new procedure.

Using the predictable

variance estimates given earlier (28.8%, 11.2%, 8.78%, and 4.34%), the
change in "success rate" achievable with the use of the circumplex
model is, respecti.vely, from • 23 to • 77, • 33 tO • 6 7, • 35 to • 65, and
• 40 to • 60.

From this perspective the circumplex model does add a

meaningful increase to the degree of variation in the empirical data
which can now be conceptualized and further investigated.
The inequality pattern of the rho-estimates simply indicate
whether a circular model in general will fit the data.

However, they

do not in and of themselves indicate the adequacy of the specific model
being tested (Wiggins et al., 1982).

The data in Table 21 more

specificially assesses the adequacy of Plutchik's (1980) circumplex
model.

Here, the rho-estiamtes have been used to evaluate the per-

centage of variance attributable to the 5 kinds of principal components which can be derived from a circumplex matri ·.

The figures in

the table suggest that a "general" and "specificity" component
accounted for relatively uniform amounts of variation in the four
analyses, i.e., approximately 13% and 8%, respectively.

Within the

limits of the present study it is not possible to further interpret
these figures.
Deviations from perfect polarity also accounted for relatively
similar amounts of variation in the empirical matrices, approximately
21.3%.

This variance indexes the adequacy of Plutchik's (1980) model
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of the polarity relations between the four sets of emotions in the
present study.

This is clear when each of the polar opposite emotions

(fear-anger, joy-sad, acceptance-disgust, surprise-expectancy) are
examined in each of the empirical matrices.

A sense for where de-

partures in polarity occurred can be obtained by counting the number
of instances when polar emotions showed negative, zero-order, or
positive correlations in the six matrices.

Joy and sadness were corr-

elated negatively 4 times, and at a zero-order magnitude 2 times.
Acceptance and disgust were negatively correlated in all 6 matrices.
Surprise and expectancy were negatively correlated 4 times, positively
1 time, and at a zero-order value 1 time.

Fear and anger showed the

largest number of deviations from polarity being positively correlated
2 times and at a zero-order magnitude 4 times.

Thus, deviations from

polarity between the emotions of fear and anger probably contributed
most to the variance captured by the principal components measuring
this deviation.
Table 21 shows the variance attributable to deviations from perfect orthogonality across the four analyses.

This variance indexes

the adequacy of Plutchik's (1980) similarity scaling of emotions in
the present data.

A sense for where the deivations are occurring can

be obtained by inspecting the correlations proceeding downward through
the columns of each table.

Perfect orthogonality would be represented

by a change in the magnitude and sign of the correlations corresponding to the rho-inequality for circumplexity (rho 1 > rho 2 > rho 3 >
rho 4, where rho 1 is positive, rho 2, zero-order, rho 3, negative,
and rho 4, highly negative).

Table 3 shows exactly how the pattern
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should appear.

Note, each column has a reversal point (e.g., column

1: rho 1, rho 2, rho 3, rho 4, rho 3, rho 2, rho 1).

Inspection of

Table 18, which exhibits the best circumplexity, is revealing.

There

appears to be a subtle trend for deviations to occur where positively
valenced emotions shift to negatively valenced ones.

For example,

joy and fear are separated by acceptance and therefore should show a
zero-order correlation (i.e., as represented by rho 2).

However, in

5 of the 6 tables, they are negatively correlated with magnitudes
ranging from -.5291 to -.0246.
A visual sense for the deviations from polarity/similarity of
the emotions in the EM data can be obtained from Figure 5.

This figure

graphs the loadings of the eight emotions on the first two principal
components extracted from the empirical correlations in Table 19 (of
the summed emotion scores).

Table 22 presents the 8 principal com-

ponents which were extracted (by decision, using the SPSSX decision
procedure for number of factors to be extracted), their eigenvalues,
percent of variance accounted for by each, and the cumulative variance
accounted for with each successive principal component.

The factor

matrix for the first three principal components, which have eigenvalues larger than 1, are also given in the table.

Table 5, given

earlier, presents the rotated factor matrix for these components using
Varimax rotation and a Kaiser normalization.
Figure 6 illustrates the roughly circular ordering of the
emotions

usi~g

placement.

principal components 1 and 2 as axes for the variable's

There is a clear separation of the positively and negatively

valenced emotions.

However, fear and anger fail to show the degree of
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Table 22
Principal Components Analysis of the Summed Emotion Scoresa Using
the Raw Data Instead of the Rhob Estimates

Cumulative

Eigenvalue

Percent
of
Variance

Factor 1

2.89

28.6

28.6

Factor 2

1.31

16.4

45.0

Factor 3

1.28

16.0

61.0

Factor 4

.96

12.0

73.0

Factor 5

.83

10.4

83.4

Factor 6

.53

6.6

90.0

Factor 7

.45

5.7

95.6

Factor 8

• 34

4.4

100.0

Principal
Components c

Factor Matrix
Variable

%

Variance

d
Principal Components
Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Disgust

.62670

• 25977

.39729

Sad

.53904

.16783

.48524

Anger

.51628

-.37627

.18278

Fear

.46394

.69796

-.23752

Surprise

.39139

.41158

.51908

Accept

-.50467

.08519

.64059

Joy

-.56065

.57632

.13066

Anticipate

-.63320

.28079

-.31052
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Table 22 (continued)

aThe summed scores are the average intensity score for an emotion
across all 5 early memories per subject.
bOrdinary least square estimates of the population correlation.
cCalculated with unities in the matrix diagonals.
dOnly Factors 1-3 included. Others have eigenvalues less than 1.
Table 4 is the rotated factor matrix for all 8 factors (emotions).

llO

FACTOR
2

Fear

( .46)

Joy •
Surprise
Anticipate •

Digust

Accept

Sad
1

(-. 5)

(. 53)

FACTOR

Anger

(-. 37)

a

The factor loadings for the eight emotions on the first and
second principal components extracted from the emotion summary
scores (i.e, the average intensity score for each emotion per
subject). N = 48.

bFour points on the four axes are given for reference.
cEPI

= The

Emotions Profile Index.

Figure 6.

Plot of the Factor Loadings for the 8 EPia
Emotions on Principal Components 1 and 2:
The Summary Emotion Scoresb,c
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polarity exhibited by the other emotions.

And, in addition, the

positions of the polar emotions of surprise-anticipation and acceptance-disgust precede sad-joy which differs from the ordering found in
Plutchik's (1980) similarity scaling solution.
One can conclude from these analyses that circumplexity can be
found in varying degrees, from fairly good to absent, in the emotions
rated in EMs.

Thus, a circular ordering appears to be of some useful-

ness in representing the magnitude of correlation between emotion
variables in EMs.

However, there are deviations from perfect polarity

and orthogonality [when Plutchik's (1980) model is used as the reference model] that must either be accounted for, or, failing this, one
must conclude that an alternative circumplex model may be constructed
to provide a better fit to the empirical relations between emotions in
EMs.

Pursuit of this would require additional research with larger

samples and direct analyses of empirical relations between emotions.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The Survey Characteristics of Early Memories
Comparison of the general content characteristics of EMs ob'

tained in the current study with those in the Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz' (1982) research suggests that EMs for a college age group
do share structural similarities.

Since only general features of EMs

were studied, little can be said about them.
ever, appear to warrant further discussion.

Five EM features, howThese will now be

considered.
Mean EM age.
study.

An older mean EM age was observed in the present

The older age in the present study can probably be attributed

to the larger number of EMs requested of the current subjects, five
instead of the "earliest" in the previous research.

It has long been

recognized that individuals can recollect very few memories from
childhood (Schachtel, 1947).

This may reflect either developmental

processes (Schachtel, 1947; White & Pillemer, 1979), or it may simply
reflect a "decay" process for memories.

Rubin (1982) has shown that

the number of memories recalled from one's past is a log-linear function of the age period from which the memories are requested.

In

other words, the number of memories available from each period of life
decreases systematically as a function of time.
112

Requesting subjects
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to recall more than the "earliest" EM would logically seem to require
that older EMs be expected in the sample.
Percentage of previous recall data.

Reqesting more than 1 EM

would seem to be a logical explanation for the differences observed
with this variable as well.

However, an additional psychological

factor (i.e., separate from a memory "decay" account) may be implicated.

Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) observed that approximately

93% of their EMs were previously recalled whereas only 76% were so
rated in the present experiment.

A decrease of 17% when 5 times as

many EMs were requested does not seem an overly large difference.
Yet, the difference between the percentages is highly significant
statistically,~=

3.40 (.£. <.01).

Perhaps the most reasonable inter-

pretation to draw is that there is something especially memorable
about the "earliest" EM as previous researchers have speculated (Adler,
1956; Olson, 1979).
might be.

Only further research can determine what this

Again, however, the difference between the two studies

(one of the "earliest" EM and one of five EMs) can probably be
attributed to methodological differences.
The "self-seen" variable.

The percentage of EMs rated as

having this feature differed across the two studies (66.3% versus
58.1%;

z = 1.75, E. <.05).

In addition, a sex difference was observed

in the present study with women rating more of their EMs (73.3%) as
having this quality than did the men (48.5%).

It does not seem

likely that methodological differences between studies can account
for either of these differences.

And, providing an account of the

differences using data obtained in the experiment or in theories of
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recollection is difficult.
The occurrence of the "self-seen" variable in autobiographical
memories does, however, appear noteworthy.

While upon first inspec-

tion the percentage of memories rated as having imagery of the physical self seemed overly large, this may not be the case.
Freud (1901/1965) noted that the "self-seen" variable appears
to be unequivocal evidence that some type of imaginative elaboration
of the memories had taken place.

Nigro and Neisser (1983), drawing

upon Bartlett's (1932) theory of recollection as "reconstruction"
arrive at a similar conclusion.
perception.

Such imagery cannot occur through

It must have been "added" to the memories after initial

encoding into memory.

These authors also provide empirical evidence

that older and more emotional autobiographical memories are the ones
most likely to have imagery of the physical self.

These three facts

(i.e., evidence for imaginative elaboration, older and more emotional
memories more likely to have the feature) combined with a more general
perspective on the nature of the recollective process can be used to
understand this feature of EMs.
The perspective on recollective processes alluded to is known
as the "generation-recognition" model of recall (Anderson & Bower,
1973; Norman & Bobrow, 1979; Reisser, in press; Reisser, Black, &
Abelson, 1985, Reisser, Black, & Kalamarides, in press).

According

to this model, remembering autobiographical experiences takes place in
at least two stages.

The first stage involves the generation of a

plausible "scenario" (Reisser, in press) or "description" (Norman &
Bobrow, 1979) of the memory that is used to cue retrieval of
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corresponding memories.

The second stage involves recognition

processes that evaluate the extent to which retrieved memories are
the one(s) sought or riot.
Reisser's studies (see references above) of the "strategies"
that subjects use to generate initial retrieval scenarios for autobiographical events reveal that certain connnon types of "general"
and "personal" knowledge and comprehension processes are involved.
Basically, scenarios utilize the same knowledge and understanding
processes involved in comprehending everyday events.

Thus, when

subjects attempt to retrieve a personal memory, they initially generate scenarios including the following types of information and
knowledge:

knowledge of actions, persons, events, places, and times.

For example, when asked, "Where were you eight weeks ago on Saturday?", subjects may utilize their general knowledge of the months in
the year to determine that 8 weeks ago was in July.

Furthermore,

they know from personal knowledge that in July they were on vacation
visiting relatives.
Sarah."

The specific relatives were "Uncle Jim" and "Aunt

This process of using general and specific knowledge contin-

ues in an iterative process that eventually provides a specific
enough scenario with which to attempt recall of a specific event
that Saturday.
It seems quite plausible that visual imagery of the self interacting with others in a specific place, in a specific way, and at a
specific time, i.e., highly concrete detail, would emerge at some
point in this iterative process of recollection.

Furthermore, visual

imagery may be quite functional for furthering recollection in at
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least two ways.

Bartlett (1932) noted that an image often guided

the recollective

proc~ss

and that subsequently retrieved detail was

used to "flesh out" the image.

The image may further recollection

by being used as a specific cue for further memories (a "guiding" of
recall);

and, as well, such an image may be useful in retaining

memory detail already retrieved as the process of recollection continues (Bartlett's "fleshing out" of the memory).
When autobiographical memory is viewed in this way, it seems
less unusual that visual imagery including the physical presence of
the self might occur.

Furthermore, it does not really seem surprising

that subjects would incorporate this "self" imagery into their subsequent representations of the event.

Having remembered something in

great detail it would only seem reasonable to retain as much of the
detail as one could.
One could go on to discuss the pitfalls of such imaginative
elaborations of memory--indeed, some researchers have begun to do so
(Loftus, 1979)--but I think this would miss the essential point.
Autobiographical memories are not about "objective events";

rather,

they are highly personal and of ten creative constructions that serve
as "anchors" for self-identity (McAdams, 1985) and self-appraisal.
A less common use of autobiographical memory entails the recollection
of the "facts."

Given the more common use of autobiographical memory

we can marvel at how accurate it can be.
Finally, Nigro and Neisser's (1983) data make a great deal of
sense within the context of the explanation just given.
memories are often more difficult to recollect.

Older

Therefore, one would
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expect subjects to utilize more elaborate retrieval processes to
remember them.

Emotional memories, in turn, may be the ones subjects

expend the most effort and time to recollect.

Thus, age and emotion-

ality may be interacting with more generic features of autobiographical recollection (i.e., the use of scenarios, gradual reconstruction,
iterative retrieval, etc.) to produce a higher incidence of the
"self-seen" feature in EMs.
be so unusual after all.

Thus, the "self-seen" variable may not

We may conclude

with Nigro and Neisser

(1983) that autobiographical recollection, rather than more restricted
forms of memory, may be the best place to study the types of imaginative reconstructions so inherent in memory processes (noted long
ago by Adler, 1956, 1969; Bartlett, 1932, Freud, 1901/1965) but
seldom adequately addressed by current research.
"Screen memories."

The data obtained suggest that Freud (1901/

1965) made a perspicuous observation about EMs with the four qualities
defining "screen memories."
might at first seem.

Such memories are not as banal as they

When the content of such memories is coded for

the presence of the eight EPI emotions they are not as neutral in
affective content as subjects rate them to be.

Subjects' "neutral"

ratings are systematically related to the presence and intensity of
emotions in EMs as can be seen from TablelO.

Subjects who recall

more "screen memories" report experiencing more negative affect and
less positive affect in their current lives and in their memories.
Since this type of EM has well-defined characteristics, further
research certainly appears warranted on the psychological factors
involved in their occurrence.

One avenue to pursue in light of
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Freud's (1901/1965) ideas might be to assess subjects' perceived
levels of family conflict as indexed by Schwarz's (Schwarz & Zuroff,
1979; Schwarz & Getter, 1980) measuring instrument.

Would subjects

with higher levels of perceived family conflict also remember more
"screen memories"?
The Emotional Content of Early Memories
The data gathered in Tables 7 and 8 represent the investigator's
coding of the eight EPI emotions in EM content.

As noted earlier,

fear, surprise, joy, acceptance, and expectation are the most common
emotions rated in EMs.

What is also apparent in these tables is

that multiple emotions are present in EMs.

This has several implica-

tions for MDR studies and perhaps for an understanding of the significance of EMs for subjects at various times in their lives.
All but a few of the studies conducted on MDR, except for
Bower's (1981) experiment 4, have examined the effects of two polar
emotions upon memory.

It was pointed out earlier that this conceptual

convenience runs counter to the occurrence of multiple emotions in
naturalistic affective states (Izard, 1971, 1972, 1977; Plutchik,
1980; Tompkins, 1962, 1963; Wessman & Ricks, 1966).

It may also

entail a loss of power to observe MDR effects especially when moderate
to low intensity mood states are studied.

Prior to the data collected

in Table 7 and 8, however, the basis for these assertions lay in an
extrapolation from naturalistic studies of affective states to
emotional influences on memory.

The present data provide direct

empirical evidence that multiple emotions are encoded into the content
of EMs.

Therefore, subsequent studies ignoring the presence of
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multiple emotions in memories will do so with a known risk (i.e.,
Type 1 errors in statistical judgments) that need not have been
accepted.
The presence of multiple emotions in EMs may also be relevant
to understanding the often changing significance of childhood memories
for subjects (Olson, 1979).

Previous studies have observed that sub-

jects reconstruct their EMs somewhat differently when under varying
emotional or motivational report conditions.

For example, Burnell

and Solomon (1964) observed that military recruits before and during
basic training, a high "stress" condition, altered their EM content
somewhat.

Specifically, the content of the memories reported during

basic training were rated as having more themes reflecting emotional
dependency and aggressive impulses.

Similarly, Tobin and Etigson

(1968) found that aged individuals prior to and during institutionalization altered their EM content.

With a similar aged non-insti-

tutionalized group as controls the hospitalized group were observed
to recall their EMs with more thematic material reflecting "death"
and "loss" during the time they were committed.
The presence of multiple emotions in EMs may help explain this
phenomena as follows.

Bower (1983; Gilligan & Bower, 1984) has shown

that subjects in particular emotional states often make cognitive
evaluations and judgments that are congruent with their emotional
state.

For example, happy and sad subjects made judgments of the

same set of facial photographs in terms of the affective characteristics of the persons portrayed.

Sad subjects "saw" many more sad

features to the facial pictures while happy subjects "saw" many more
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happy features.
their EMs.

The same phenomena may be true of subjects recalling

However, rather than interpreting this as an emotionally-

induced "distortion" of the reality of the events encoded, it may
reflect instead an alternative evaluation based on emotional features
ignored while in a polar emotional state.

Surely the most signifi-

cant events in a person's life are often amenable to different interpretation and evaluation at different times.
Some researchers prefer to interpret the revisions of personal
history that can be obtained from subjects at different times as a
reflection of a less benign process.

Greenwald (1980), for example,

attributes such revisions to the operation of a "totalitarian ego."
Such an "ego" exercises "hegemonistic" control over the cognitive
apparatus so as to distort the "reality" of the past.

Perhaps such

revisions need not always reflect so tendentious a process.

Instead,

they may reflect the influence of emotional states upon perception,
cognition, and memory.

It is less sensible to conclude that one

emotional state is the "correct" or "real" perspective with which to
view events than to perceive it as one of many valid and "real"
alternatives (based on the multiple emotions which individuals are
capable of experiencing).

Indeed, such revisions of personal history

may be indicative of adaptability rather than "maladaption."

The

capacity to perceive new features of one's past, to imaginatively
"re-vision" (Hillman, 1975) one's present and future, may be the
most adaptive capacity individuals possess.

The effects of emotions

on perception, thought, and memory may be central to this capacity.
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Mood-Dependent Recall of Early Memories
The predictions of the current study, based upon the literature
review in Chapter II, were largely supported by the results.
shows that MDR can be observed for EMs.

Table 13

Furthermore, the intensity

of the mood state appears to moderate the degree of MDR observed
(compare Table 11 and 13).

Thus, it appears that MDR is non-linearly

related to the intensity of mood states.

Subjects at moderate moods

show a different recall pattern than do subjects at more extreme
mood intensities (see Figure 5).
The present study observed asymmetric MDR regardless of the
method of classifying subjects.
5 were not supported.

Therefore, the details of Hypothesis

However, this may be due to the limited range

of mood-intensities studied in the present experiment.

Further

research with a larger range of mood-intensities therefore appears
warranted.
Studying a larger range of mood-intensities may also help
clarify the "moderates" effect observed in Figure 5.

It is not at

all clear why subjects at more moderate moods would recall more sad
EMs than "sad" subjects and fewer happy EMs than "sad" subjects.
Possible reasons for the "moderate" effect may be the presence of
more discrete negative emotions in moderate mood states as would be
predicted by Plutchik's model (1980; see Figure 3).

A second reason

may be that there is an interaction between the distribution of
emotions in memories and the distribution of emotions in naturally
varying mood states.

This would be the prediction of the encoding

specificity principle account of MDR (Bower, 1981).

Clearly, both
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more data and more precise conceptualization are required to explain
the pattern of recall observed in moderate mood states.
Circumplexity Between Emotions in Early Memories
Circumplexity was observed in 4 of the 6 analyses conducted on
the emotions rated in EMs.

The circumplexity observed in EM 5 was

the most clear-cut evidence observed.

Several assumptions were made

in conducting these analyses and it is instructive to review them
now in light of the data obtained on the survey characteristics of
EMs.
The most basic assumption was that circumplexity exists between
emotions in naturalistic mood states (Diener & Emmons, 1985; Plutchik,
1980).

Second, it was assumed that memories of experiences would

encode "features" pertaining to each discrete emotion.

Third, it

was assumed that such "features" could be identified and rated for
"intensity" from the recall reports produced by the subjects.

And

fourth, it was assumed that subjects could reliably produce reports
that would reflect the relation between each emotion as it naturally
occurred at the time of the experience.

Of these assumptions the

fourth appears to be the most problematic in light of the data
obtained in the present study.
The discussion of the "self-seen" variable presented earlier
makes this clear.

There can be little question that a large percen-

tage of EMs have undergone some degree of imaginative elaboration.
This elaboration theoretically would be expected to influence both
the MDR and the circumplexity analyses.

However, of the two types

of analysis the latter would probably be most adversely affected.
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It really matters little for MDR when emotions are encoded into
memories.

It is simply the congruency between current mood and

affective quality of the memories which is predicted.

However, the

second and fourth assumptions stated above are critical for the circumplexity analyses.

If the EM content contains some blending of

emotions present during the initial experience and the blend present
during later encodings, the resultant pattern might not reflect the
relations between emotions in naturalistic affective states.

In

retrospect, EMs may not have been the best place to search for circumplexity between emotions.
The circumplex hypothesis constrains every relation observable
in a matrix of correlations.

Therefore, it is noteworthy that

varying degrees of circumplexity were observed between emotions in
EMs.

Bower's (1981) research strategy for varying four emotions

across encoding and retrieval conditions may be the only truly direct
way to examine the implications of circumplexity between emotions
upon MDR.

In light of the present results such strenuous research

effort appears definitely worthwhile.
Bower's (1981, 1983; Gilligan & Bower, 1984) research has
demonstrated pervasive and extensive influences of emotions upon
memory, thought, and perception.

Further research should be con-

ducted in a more orderly way taking into account the naturalistic
relations between emotions in affective states.

In addition, each

discrete emotion may have different functional impact upon memory,
cognition, and perception.

Izard (1977), Plutchik (1980), and

Tompkins (1962, 1963, 1979) have made many suggestions in this
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regard.

For example, a sad emotion may produce little mood-congruent

learning because it often leads to the withdrawal of attention from
the environment.

However, joy, fear, and anger may have the opposite

effect since each emotion is obviously related to what is going on in
the environment around the subjects.

The present study represents

additional evidence consistent with these theories in that emotions
are organized not only in naturalistic states but in memories as well.
General Conclusions
The current study adds to the growing body of research demonstrating the influence of emotions upon memory processes.

Chapter I

reviewed previous MDR research and concluded that variability across
studies in the degree of MDR obtained might be attributable to failure to adequately conceptualize and experimentally control the
natural parameters of emotions, i.e., their similarity, polarity,
and intensity.

The present study provided mixed evidence in support

of this conclusion.
Specifically, MDR was observed with EMs but fully synnnetric
MDR could not be demonstrated.
moderate the degree of MDR.

Furthermore, intensity was shown to

Given the range of mood intensities

studied, the present research in retrospect can be seen as failing
to achieve sufficient "power" with which to observe the hypothesized
relationships.

Finally, circumplexity was observed in varying

degrees between emotions in EMs.

Thus, a circumplex model of emotions

was shown to be useful in understanding some of the variation between
emotions in memories.
How might future research on emotional influences upon memory
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and other cognitive processes proceed?

Most generally, I think that

future research must begin to consider the naturalistic expressions,
characteristics, and relations among discrete emotions.
areas for future research are as follows.

Two principle

Further data is required

on the relations between emotions in naturalistic affective states.
Plutchik's (1980) model is primarily based on similarity judgments
between affective terms.

Work conducted by Diener and Emmons (1985)

indicates the more preferred strategy for studying emotional states.
Unfortunately, however, this last research did not investigate the
entire circumplex model.

Therefore, a research study to accomplish

this is currently underway.
The usefulness of a circumplex model for understanding MDR can
only be fully tested by more directly studying the influence of several discrete emotions on memory.

Since Bower (1981, experiment 4)

has already studied the effects of joy, sadness, fear, and anger, an
initial study in this direction might investigate the effects of
disgust, acceptance, expectancy and surprise.
Aspects of the circumplex model can be tested in other ways as
well.

One of the predictions made from Figure 4 was that the blending

between emotions in affective states will vary depending upon the
intensity of each emotion present.

This prediction is independent of

MDR but also has implications for it.

A preliminary test of this

feature of the model can be made by assessing the varying relation
between emotions as a function of emotional intensity.

This could

be studied both in the context of MDR and in natural mood states
alone.

Both of these studies are essential.

The "moderates" effect
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shown in Figure S may ultimately be unravelled by this type of
study.
The importance of determining the validity of Plutchik's (1980)
model for understanding the interaction between emotion intensity and
MDR (as well as other influences or emotions on behavior) was recently
highlighted in a series of "connnentary" articles on a recent failure
to obtain mood-congruent learning (MCL).

Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Shaft,

and Doren (1985) reported a failure to obtain MCL when a large sample
of "sub-clinically depressed" college subjects were studied.

These

authors state that their subjects were chosen, despite their very
low levels of "depression" (probably more accurately identified as
moderately sad), because they assumed that 1) mood has an underlying
linear dimension of intensity, and 2) that mood-intensity is linearly
related to degree of MDR (Hasher et al., 1985).
Failing to find MCL with their subjects they retract both
assumptions in their reply article (Hasher, Zacks, Rose, & Doren,
1985).

There is no basis for doubting a linear dimension of mood-

intensity in their data;

only the latter of the two assumptions

is logically invalidated by their results.

It must be stressed that

these investigators used unusual care in measuring the moods of their
subjects and they also made repeated mood measurements to ensure
that their subjects maintained their mildly sad mood levels throughout the study.

In other words, this was a carefully executed and

thorough study within the limits of what is currently known about
emotions.
The connnentary articles on this study are similarly instructive.
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Ellis (1985), Isen (1985), and Mayer and Bower (1985) offered a rich
variety of speculations on why MCL was not observed.

However, most

of this was directed toward non-emotion factors that could increase
the methodological precision of emotion-influence studies.

In

addition, Isen (1985) concluded that asymmetric MCL and MDR had been
routinely observed, therefore it must be a systematic phenomena.
Ellis (1985) speculated that emotional intensity moderated the
degree of MDR but he could give no reasonable account of why this
might be the case.

Mayer and Bower (1985) offered a similar hypoth-

esis about mood-intensity and they also noted that different induction procedures might produce differing combinations of emotions.
However, no one suggested that emotion polarity, similarity, and
intensity might be interactive dimensions of emotions moderating MDR
and MCL.

Instead, subject factors, variations in materials used,

and interactions between materials and moods were offered as the
primary accounts for MDR and MCL variability.
It seems to be more parsimonious to consider characteristics
directly related to emotions as moderators of MDR and MCL, as was
done in Chapter II, than to speculate about non-emotion factors.

If

emotion intensity modulates the similarity and polarity relations
between discrete emotions in affective states, then a unified
account of MDR and MCL variability may be possible.

This would

certainly be more valuable than the proliferation of non-emotion
factors currently being suggested as accounts for variability across
separate studies.
Several caveats and conclusions can be drawn from the present
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study and the literature which has been reviewed.

First, emotions

need to be more adequately conceptualized using the data available
from studies of the naturalistic expression of emotions (e.g., Diener

& Emmons, 1985; Ekman, 1982; Izard, 1971, 1972, 1977; Plutchik, 1980;
Tompkins, 1962, 1963, 1979).
component" of cognitions.

Emotions are not just the "evaluative

They are much more fundamental than this.

One of the more profitable ways to study the relation between
emotions and cognitive processes may be to recognize that they interact temporally (Lewis, Sullivan, & Michalson, 1983).

Such temporal

interactions may be understood quite directly through the use of
Tulving's (1983) "encoding specificity principle."

This principle

provides a very broad generalization about the interaction between
encoding and retrieval processes.

It may be worthwhile to see how

far this principle can go in explaining mood-cognition effects before
the introduction of alternative and less cohesive accounts.
Focusing upon the temporal integration of cognition and emotion
would be quite consistent with a current trend in personality and
motivational theory.

Theorists are increasingly recognizing the need

to conceptualize their variables in dynamic-temporal rather than
static-atemporal terms (Atkinson, 1983; Atkinson & Birch, 1978;
Klinger, 1977; Martindale, 1982; McClelland, 1985).

Pervin (1985)

has suggested that much of the recent trend toward ''cognitive"
approaches to personality and motivation stems from a dissatisfaction
with "trait" approaches.

Such approaches appear to do injustice to

the rich variability that can be observed in the actions of individuals over time and across situations.

However, at a theoretical
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level cognitive-developmental approaches (Damon, 1985) are as static
as "trait" models of behavior.

Such models assume an inherent

stability to cognitive processes within "stages."
"stages" is said to occur;

Transition between

but, once achieved, subsequent variability

in cognitive processes is neither expected or predicted.

It is

treated, perhaps inappropriately, as "measurement error."
The opposite would be true of a theory of personality and
motivational processes conceptualized in dynamic-temporal terms.

A

suggestion toward this end was made earlier in the interpretation
of the "self-seen" variable.

If personality-motivation is concep-

tualized as an independent system of processes interacting over time
with cognitive and memory processes, then there may be a true
possibility for understanding the intricate and subtle changes in
the behavior of individuals in different situations and at different
times.

A valuable source of data toward this end may be the

"unique" (Greenwald, 1981) effects of emotions upon thought, perception, and memory.
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E.R. No.
Name:

Age: _ _ Sex:
Early Memories Recording Form

Date:_/_/_

*

In the space provided below please write out a description of your
earliest memory (or if you have already reported the earliest one,
then another early memory). Please think back to your childhood, going
as far back as you can possibly go, and then write a description of
this recollection in detail below. Please do not report something that
someone else has told you about. Only report a memory you are sure
you can remember yourself.
Please be reasonably complete in your recollection and write as legibly
as you are able. After you have finished, please go on to the next
task as directed by the person administering this study.
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How old were you at the time of the event you remembered?
estimate your age to the nearest birthday:
~~-

Please

years

How clear was the memory?

Check one:

Cloudy

Vivid

Clear

Is the memory you have described one that you just thought of on being
asked, or is it one that you have thought of before? Check one:
~~~~-

~~-

Remembered just now
Thought of occasionally before
Thought of often before

What was the feeling involved in the memory?
~~-

Pleasant

~~-

Neutral

Check one:
~~-

Unpleasant

More specifically, briefly describe the emotion(s) that were associated
with the memory (for example, happiness, anger, or surprise):

What specific sensory images did you experience while you were
recalling the memory? Check each one that applies:
Vision (seeing)

Gustatory (taste)

Audition (hearing)

Olfactory (smell)

Tactile (touch)

Kinesthetic (movement)

If vision was involved, was the memory image in black-and-white or
in color? Check one:
Color

Black-and-white

If vision was involved, did you see yourself in the memory, or did you
see only what others were doing about you? Check one:
Saw myself

~~-

Saw others only

If you saw yourself, briefly describe what you saw yourself doing:

Please add any other comments that might be of interest regarding your
earliest memory:

Thank you for your cooperation.
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Early Memories Rating Form
Please answer the following questions about the early memories you
wrote down earlier in this study. The questions will require that
you look over your previous answers. Please take the time to do so.
1.) Most people can usually judge whether some things are more
meaningful and important to them than others. This is usually
true even in situations where all of the things being judged are
important in some way or another. Please make this judgment
about the five early memories you reported earlier. When you are
making your judgment, however, I would like you to be considering
how personally meaningful to you the recollected memories are
in terms of your current life interests, hopes, wishes and
feelings. When you make your judgment please keep in mind that
what is being judged is the overall feeling of meaningfulness
for you of the memories.
1.

2.

(Most meaningful •

3.

4.

5.
Less meaningful)

Please write the number of the early memory which belongs in each
numbered slot. The "number of the early memory" is at the top
of the sheet where the memory is written.
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Introduction to the Early Memories Study:

Consent Form

This study is about the earliest memories that people have of
events, or experiences, in their lives.

If you decide to participate

in the study you will be asked to recall five (5) of the earliest
memories you can recollect in your life.
should be one of the memories you report.

Your very first memory
You will be asked to write

a narrative description of each memory and to answer several questions
about each recollection.

All of these questions will be given in

the form of a questionnaire, so you will be able to take as much time
as you like in answering.

Since this study is based on the assumption

that each person's memory reflects the integrity of the person,
several non-memory questionnaires will also be given to you to complete before and after the recollection portion of the study.
All of your written answers will be kept strictly confidential.
Please feel free to answer these questions without inhibition.

Your

true feelings, thoughts, and memories can be expressed if you wish.
If you are willing to participate in this study, please sign
your name and the date in the space provided below to indicate this
willingness.

Name:

Date:
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Coding Emotions in Early Childhood Memories:
A Coding Manual

1

1

This coding manual is based upon an earlier version developed by
Wynne and Plutchik (1974, unpublished manuscript).
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Introduction
This manual provides guidelines for coding the presence and
intensity of eight basic emotions in Early Childhood Memories (ERs).
The emotions coded by this manual are drawn from the work of Robert
Plutchik (Emotions, New York: Harper & Row, 1980); and the present
manual is a revised version of the manual developed by Plutchik and
Wynne (1974, unpublished manuscript). The current manual adopts the
basic form and content of the previous manual and introduces changes
primarily designed to amplify and clarify material already present in
the first version.
Emotions can be described in several ways. The emotion of fear,
for example, can be described in subjective "feeling" terms like
fright, terror, etc. However, the emotion of fear can also be
described and amplified by terms referring to behavior (e.g., avoidance, withdrawal, etc.), to functions (e.g., protection), and to
character traits (e.g., timid, shy, etc.). Plutchik (1980) has
argued a similar structural relationship underlies the relatedness
of these different "languages" of emotion.
The redundancy between these different languages of emotion can
facilitate the rating of emotions in ERs. Thus, while each of the
eight emotion coding scales provided below are identified by a subjective "feeling" term, notice that each coding scale also includes
material related to each of the four different "languages" of emotions
just described. This means that it is not necessary for an ER to
contain an explicit reference to a subjective "feeling" term for an
emotion in order for that emotion to be identified and coded as
present. Evidence for the presence and intensity of an emotion should
be sought by using these four languages of emotion, not just be reference to subjective feeling terms. Priority, however, especially in
cases of doubt, should be given to subjective references.
The basic process of coding the ERs is as follows. First, determine whether an emotion is at all present. Second, if an emotion is
judged to be present, make a judgment concerning the intensity of the
emotion using a three-category scale: low, medium, and high. Third,
judge the intensity of the emotion as either high or low within the
category (low, medium, high) just previously mentioned, i.e., having
decided fear at a low intensity is present, make a further two-part
distinction, and decide whether it is a low level, low intensity
expression, or a high level, low intensity expression of fear. In
effect, you will have a seven-point scale for rating each emotion:
zero (O) = emotion is absent; one (1) = low, low intensity; two (2)
= high, low intensity; three (3) = low, medium intensity; four (4)
= high, medium intensity; five (5) = low, high intensity; and six (6)
= high, high intensity.
Only rate emotions experienced by the "hero" (i.e., the rememberer) of the ER. Intensity judgments are to be made using the
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underlying intensity scale implied in the language of the memory
(e.g., irritated, angry, and enraged imply an increasing level of
intensity), and by the underlying scale implied in the language
describing the actions and events depicted (e.g., "I pushed him,"
"I hit him in the face," and "I beat him senseless" imply an increasing level of intensity to the emotion of anger).
Qualifications of actions, feelings, and events within the ER
can be used to judge intensity as well (e.g., "I swore at him. It
must have really scared him because he looked frightened."); however,
qualifications of the entire ER should not be used in rating intensity of the emotional (e.g., "this is a very vague memory," when
given as a qualification, for example, to the immediately preceding
example, should not be used to decrease an intensity rating). Notice
that reference to feelings, behaviors, functions, and traits are all
used in determining the presence and intensity of emotion.
To simplify the rating task you will be asked to rate sets of
ERs for one emotion (and only one) at a time. Do not try to recall
your previous ratings when judging the presence and intensity of
suceeding emotions. Emotions can occur singly or in combinations.
Therefore, rating one emotion at a time should facilitate more accurate coding of any and all emotions present in the ER. You may notice
that some statements imply multiple emotions, e.g., "I was laying on
my bed when suddenly the door burst open, my brother walked in wearing
a frightening halloween costume, and I was so happy to see him because
he had been away so long, that I didn't yell at him for scaring me."
This ER could appropriately be scored for surprise-startle, fear, and
joy (and, if further information is given, perhaps even sadnessdeprivation). Please note, however, that your task when coding this
ER is to consider only the single emotion you are presently coding
for. Do not be concerned with whether other emotions are present;
you will have a chance to exercise this sensitivity to the presence
of multiple emotions when each emotion is coded in turn.
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THE ANTICIPATION SCALE
0
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3
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4
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5

6

very extremely
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Scoring Criteria
1.) Anticipation is indicated by feelings of expectancy, anticipation, curiosity, alertness, inquisitiveness, and vigilance (this
is a curious alertness, not a fearful alertness): behaviorally
this emotion is indicated by exploring, looking, listening,
touching (i.e., sensory activity aimed at evaluating, locating
and identifying things) etc.; functionally, this emotion is
generally indicated by exploratory behavior; in the language
of traits, anticipation is suggested by controlled behavior.
2.) Be sure to distinguish anticipatory reactions to events which
primarily indicate fearfulness (e.g., anticipating a fearful
event) from the basic emotion of anticipation which is mo~e
directly concerned with anticipatory inquisitiveness and exploration. Score the former for fear, and the latter for anticipation. Exploration to alleviate a fear is scored.
3.) Score incidents indicating an active desire or behavior directed
toward getting to know one's current environment (or past or
future, as well).
4.) Score incidents evidencing feelings of curiosity and desire to
explore and manipulate things.
5.) Often anticipation is indicated in statements emphasizing the
sensory aspects of events (e.g., loudness, bright, shining colors,
as in "There was a loud noise, I couldn't figure it out," or
"The bright shining colors were fascinating.").
6.) New play experiences imply exploration or inquisitiveness.
7.) Amazement is a combination of surprise and exploration. The
surprise component is stronger, therefore, when assigning an
intensity score be sure to assign a lower score for the anticipation component (e.g., an amazement response might be assigned
a four (4) on the surprise dimension and a two (2) on the anticipation dimension to rate this differential contribution to
these two basic emotions to the experience of "amazement.").
IF ANTICIPATION IS ABSENT, ASSIGN A SCORE OF ZERO (0).
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LOW INTENSITY ANTICIPATION (score 1 or 2) .
Seeking new experiences: "It was a very hot, sunny day, and I was
searching for something to do."
Achievement: "In the first grade, I remember·learning how to print
and draw, I became a very good painter and won a contest at a
state fair for printing and drawing." (Comment: this involved
a new learning experience which implies the willingness to
explore a new activity, the score is for this exploration.)
Sensory Activity: "My favorite glass had orange juice in it, and it
had a bunch of folds at the bottom too"(a picture of the glass
was drawn to accompany the description). (Comment: this
description indicates a strong sensory attraction to the object
described, and this visual attraction results in a detailed
visual knowledge of the object which implies visual sensory
exploration of the object.)
Work Memories: "Helping my father fix the car before a long journey."
(Comment: fixing an object requires prior diagnostic assessment
of the problem which is a type of exploratory behavior.)
MEDIUM INTENSITY ANTICIPATION (score 3 or 4)
Exploring Things: "The earliest memory I can recall is rummaging
through my grandmother's attic. I recall finding many interesting things such as an old army uniform, ice-skates, and
other objects." (Comment: finding implies prior search, and
indeed the person reports "rummaging.")
Sensory Activity: "I remember a great deal of sunshine in the room.
Either my sister's clothes or the bedspread was pink. I also
remember yellow pastels--perhaps the sunlight. I don't remember
any specific emotion except sunlight and a definite aura of
pastel colors." (Comment: scored for visual exploration of
details)
Work Memory: "I also remember being able to cook and help with the
dishes around this time, something I did frequently." (Comment:
both activities imply ordered, and hence anticipated sequences
of acts; furthermore, the qualify "frequently" suggests this
was a routine involvement in these activities.)
Manipulation: "Making paper airplanes. We folded them, about a
hundred of them, and I can still see them spread out on the
couch." (Comment: This activity requires attention to detail,
i.e., exploration of the materials and the goal; while the
number produced gives a sense of the extended nature o.f this
attention.)
Expectancy: "I remember hoping the baby would be a girl. My father
called the doctor who arrived after what seemed an interminable
delay."
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MEDIUM INTENSITY ANTICIPATION (continued)
Curiosity: "I remember asking my parents about animals, and cars, and
all sorts of things, all of the time." (Comment: The activity
of questioning and its frequency are the basis for scoring this
memory.)
Fascination: "There was a bridge over the stream which seemed quite
deep. This fascinated me, for there seemed to be caves along
the sides of the stream." (Comment: Fascination, like amazement, involves both expectancy and surprise. The detailed
description of a new environment implies visual exploration.)
HIGH INTENSITY ANTICIPATION (score 5 or 6)
Fascination: "I also remember teacher giving me my first science book
(astronomy) which caught my interest and kept me reading one
astronomy book after another that year and for many a year
thereafter."
Excitement: "He pushed me in the cart way across town and we went to
some drug store. I was so excited at the time." (Comment:
this activity is scored as exploratory, the intensity judgment
is based on the qualifying statement made about excitement.)
Sensory Activity: "I named the colors of the store fronts, automobiles and merchandise as we passed. This became a standard
activity during walks. My parents pointing to items and my
labeling it with its colors. There were numerous people and
much excitement during this time." (Comment: This is being
scored for the exploration of the environment described, the
new learning involved, and the qualifier about the intensity of
the experience.)

Note:

Cognitive-processing such as worry about the future, or a
specific events, planning, etc. imply anticipation. Be sure
to distinguish fearful cognitive-processing from the type of
exploratory activity which is being scored as anticipation.
Only score for this emotion when the cognitive-processing
which is being described involves a clear reference to exploratory action of some kind, e.g., trying to resolve an issue,
deal with a problem, etc. Otherwise, examine the extent to
which emotions such as fear and sadness might not be more
appropriate emotional influences to consider.
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THE DISGUST SCALE
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Scoring Criteria
1.) Disgust is indicated by feelings of revulsion, loathing, sarcasm,
dislike, aversion, intolerance, and often prejudice; behaviorally
by avoiding contact with, moving away from, lying (by rejecting
the truth); functionally by tendencies to reject people, places,
events, or things; and by character traits of dogmatism, disbelief, and distrust.
2.) Avoidance due to fear is not scored for disgust.
3.) Often indicated by avoiding new experiences. And, by tendencies to
prejudice individuals or events in negative ways.
4.) Bitterness is partly disgust and partly anger.
5.) Shame is a combination of disgust and fear.
6.) Scorn, indignation, resentment, and contempt are combinations of
disgust and fear.
7.) Feeling betrayed is a combination of anger, disgust, and fear.
8.) Humiliation is a combination of sadness, anger, and disgust.
IF DISGUST IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (O)
LOW INTENSITY DISGUST (score 1 or 2)
Rejecting People: "The girl next door called to me to play with her on
her swings. I pretended I didn't hear her and ran onto the
porch."
Avoiding New Experiences: "Thinking that I never wanted to grow up
because things were going so well."
Boredom: "When I was four years old I was asked to be a mascot at a
high school graduation. I wore a white evening gown and fell
half-asleep part way through the program."
MEDIUM INTENSITY DISGUST (score 3 or 4)
Rejecting Situations: "I decided not to cry from pain and consequently
refused to say I was sorry. My friends told me not to walk on
thin ice but I did anyway."
Aversion: "I remember feeling an uneasiness as she washed the vaginal
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area.

I used to try to avoid letting her touch me there."

Prejudging Events Negatively: "It was my longest stay away from home
in a strange environment which I just knew I wasn't going to like."
Intolerance: "When I was four years old, my older sister was in a
hospital. She came home with all her hair shaved off. I laughed
at her."
Dislike: "I didn't like my teacher."
HIGH INTENSITY DISGUST (score 5 or 6)
Disgust: "My uncle forcing me to eat lima beans (which I disliked
intensely) in order that we go to a parade. Since we were in a
restaurant at that time, I ate them, and promptly vomited. The
time I ate cheese and grapes and vomited. I was a very ugly
child."
Loathing: "He had a beard and I loathed his kissing me on the forehead."
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THE SADNESS SCALE
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Scoring Criteria
1.) Sadness is indicated by the individuals' reports of feelings of
sadness, grief, loss, depression, mourning, melancholy, sorrow,
nostalgia, distress, pessimism, sentimentality, detachment, dejection, and loneliness; behaviorally when the individual cries,
acts distressed, attempts to withdraw into self, gives, up, etc.;
functionally sadness is expressed in efforts to reintegrate, i.e.,
to reestablish contact with the lost, or unattained (unattainable)
object; inthe language of traits, sadness is indicated by
depression, moodiness (sad), and pessimism.
2.) Common events referred to are getting lost with an emphasis on
sorrow rather than fear; if no affect is mentioned the Early
recollection should be scored low. Indicates by states of
deprivation: tiredness, hunger, disability. Reference to unfair
treatment, injustice, etc.
3.) Jealousy should be scored partially sadness (deprivation), partially anger (destruction).
4.) Embarassment is sadness and surprise.
IF SADNESS (DEPRIVATION) IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (O)
LOW INTENSITY SADNESS (score 1 or 2)
Getting Lost: "I got lost from my mother. I couldn't find her and
finally a lady brought me to the police station."
Being Sent to Bed: "I was sent out of the room and up to bed."
MEDIUM INTENSITY SADNESS (score 3 or 4)
Loss of Desired Object: "He tied the balloon on my finger, but somehow
it got away. I was miserable the rest of the day."
Deprived of Desired Object: "My uncle gave everyone a piece of chewing
gum for eating their spinach, but he wouldn't give me any until
I ate mine."
Melancholy: "I became very sad listening to the violin music."
Disappointment: "We dug until we were tired, but found no treasure.
was tired and disappointed."

I
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Sadness: "I somehow remember feeling depressed about being alone and
inside on a fine summer day. Because I was small I was always
getting beaten up."
HIGH INTENSITY SADNESS (score 5 or 6)
Loneliness: "Later I heard he had been killed in an auto accident.
felt very horrible but I always cherished his ring."
Grief: "Some boy scratched the doll's eyes out.
have ever again been so heartbroken."

I don't think I

Getting Lost: "I got lost from my family and I was so unhappy.
thought I'd never find them again."
Loss: "My mother took me and left me at school.
never come back for me."

I

I thought she would

I
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THE JOY SCALE
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Scoring Criteria
1.) Joy is indicated by the individuals' reports of feelings of
happiness, joy, pleasure, sexual gratification, passion, delight,
sensuality, love, ecstasy (more mildly by contentment, calmness,
relief) and often by serenity; behaviorally, joy is often
indicated by laughter, amusement, giving, kindness, sympathy,
pride, sexual attraction (and behavior);
functionally, joy is
indicated at the most abstract level by the idea of reproduction,
which implies courting, mating, etc., and the overall "thrust"
of the emotion is for sensual contact and the reproduction of
self. (The logic here is illustrated in altruistic behavior
where the individual is much more likely to engage in altruistic
acts when feeling joyful, fulfilled, etc., in effect reproducing
itself in the person helped.) In the language of traits, joy is
indicated by gregariousness, altruism, confidence, pride, and
optimism.
2.) If feelings of joy, happiness, satisfaction, etc. occur in the
context of food, receiving gifts, then the memory should be scored
on the acceptance-incorporation scale. Activities which indirectly
refer to acceptance-incorporation, e.g., "We had a great time when
we went shopping at the grocery store" do receive a score on the
joy scale.
IF JOY IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (0)
LOW INTENSITY JOY (score 1 or 2)
Warm Ties: "I loved being allowed to go to the hospital when he was
brought home and being able to hold him."
Contentment: ''My grandmother made all new clothes for it and I was
quite content."
MEDIUM INTENSITY JOY (score 3 or 4)
Warm Ties: "I loved being allowed to go to the hospital when he was
brought home and being able to hold him."
Pleasure: "He just walked in and kissed my mother and then he came
over to my twin's and my crib and picked us up. Then we had
dinner. I felt very happy and we were all in a good mood.,.-
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Satisfaction: "It gave me satisfaction to know I could win the
battles."
Happiness: "A girl taking me to my first halloween party and the
wonderful time we had."
Sensuality: "I had a means of achieving sexual enjoyment by placing
my hand under my penis and moving my behind up and down."
HIGH INTENSITY JOY (score 5 or 6)
Joy: "I loved the snow and enjoyed playing in it immensely."
Ecstasy: "It was an absolutely thrilling experience."
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THE SURPRISE-STARTLE SCALE
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Scoring Criteria
1.) Surprise is indicated by reference to feelings of wonder, amazement, astonishment, puzzlement, distraction, strangeness, shock,
etc.; behaviorally, it is indicated by orienting attention
towards the object eliciting the emotion and often ceasing other
activity (note: orienting away from, moving away from, escaping
the thing which elicited the surprise can occur and these
responses are more properly conceptualized as subsequent to the
initial surprise, see Criteria 2 below); functionally, this
emotion is the orienting response, a transitory behavior resulting
from some unexpected object, or experience. In the language of
traits, this emotion is dyscontrolled behavior (e.g., hysteria).
2.) In general the emotion of surprise is followed by some other form
of emotional behavior such as joy, fear, anger, etc., which simply
reflect a specific evaluation of the object.
3.) Awe is a combination of fear and surprise.
4.) Embarrassment is surprise and sadness.
5.) Disappointment is surprise and sadness.
6.) "Shock" often refers to surprise and disgust, fear, or anger.
7.) Revulsion often refers to surprise and disgust.
8.) Outrage often refers to surprise and anger.
9.) Surprise is often indicated by the following emotion terms:
fascination, confusion, wonderment, bewilderment, etc.

alert,

10.) Surprise is often indicated in the narrative style used to describe an event. This is a style characterized by lack of coherence
and cohesion. For example, continuity, predictableness, and
narrative "telegraphing" are missing. "We were drawing pictures
when this boy next to me pissed in his pants." The conjunction
"and" conjoins events that are spatailly and temporally contiguous
but does not reflect the narrator's cognitive integration of the
events.
11.) Surprise is often indicated by sudden alterations in the perception of self and others, e.g., "My sister and I felt like grownups when it happened."
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IF SURPRISE-STARTLE IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (0)
LOW INTENSITY SURPRISE (score 1 or 2)
Mild Surprise: "My first day at school was very interesting and I was
surprised to find that some children were crying."
Mild Confusion: "I was playing with a ball, and there seemed to be
all sorts of other kids around, too, all doing something or other."
MILD INTENSITY SURPRISE (score 3 or 4)
Puzzlement: "I walked back to the car in puzzlement."
Confusion: "I remember how confused I was as to what the big mechanical contraption would be able to do."
Wonder: "I looked over the pantry door and wondered why the servant
signal did not work."
Amazement: In amazement I put my hands on my head and looked to the
ground and she took my picture.
HIGH INTENSITY SURPRISE (score 5 or 6)
Astonishment: "I can't help remembering how shocked I was the first
time I saw her. All of a sudden a pedestrian ran up and pushed
me out of the way of the car."
Awe: "I walked around through the debris and was awed at all the
damage."
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THE ANGER SCALE
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Scoring Criteria
1.) Anger is indicated when the individual reports feelings of anger,
hostility, frustration, irritation, etc.; behaviorally, when the
individual engages in behaviors such as hitting, pushing, yelling,
rough and tumble play, etc.; functionally, by destroying,
breaking, harming; and by character traits of punitiveness,
aggressiveness and belligerence.
2.) Pride, especially at the expense of others, is partially anger
and partially acceptance.
3.) Bitterness toward others is partially anger and partially disgust,
or rejection.
4.) Anger is often indicated by references to such affects as:
irritation, annoyance, discomfort, and defiance.
5.) Yelling, when done in happy excitement is not scored.
6.) Conventional activities (e.g., games, play, etc.) when
involving active, strenuous, physical effort, or activity
(e.g., wrestling, chasing, jumping on something) are scored
for anger.
7.) Actions engaged in by the hero which do not appear to willfully or intentionally involve destruction, but do have this
result, especially through carelessness, are scored. The
idea is to score strongly assertive and physically strenuous
acts as having the quality of aggressiveness.
8.) Score for the presence of this emotion even if the overall
story, or the ending, imply a different emotion is involved
as well.
IF ANGER IS ABSENT, OR NOT PRESENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (0)
LOW INTENSITY ANGER (score 1 or 2)
Annoyance: "They kept looking at me, and I was annoyed at them."
Irritation: "I would become very irritable when awakened from sleep."
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MEDIUM INTENSITY ANGER (score 3 or 4)
Attacking People: "When I was about five years old, my sister and
I were fighting in a big chair. I knocked her out of the chair
and she hit her head on the radiator."
Hostility: 'T remember fighting with my sister because I thought my
mother liked her better."
Frustration: "I was unable to throw or catch the ball with any
accuracy. I had tried everything, but it was impossible because
I was so uncoordinated."
HIGH INTENSITY ANGER (score 5 or 6)
Destroying Things: "I threw my bottle on the street and smashed it
to pieces."
Frustration: "I would get angry at somebody. I would bang my head
against the wall and continue until I got my way. I had been
relegated to the seat upon her birth and I deeply resented it."
Rage: "He took my doll and I was so furious I kicked him."
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THE FEAR SCALE
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Scoring Criteria
1.) Fear is indicated when the individual reports subjective feelings
of fear; behaviorally, when1he individual engages in escape or
avoidance behavior; functionally, by efforts to protect oneself
or others; and by character traits of timidity.
2.) Common events referred to are painful events, or to the experiencing of pain, discomfort or injury.
3.) Often indicated by reports of feelings of fear, anxiety, panic,
or apprehension.
4.) Fear is indicated by reference to such related emotion terms as
shyness, social inhibition, lack of assertiveness, anticipation
of fearful or frightening events, humiliation, terror, obedience
(when unwilling), or guilty ruminations.
5.) Often indicated in stories of getting lost, or of being left alone,
especially when the emphasis or focus of the narration is upon
feelings of fear, panic, apprehension, etc., instead of upon
sorrow.
6.) Guilt is partly joy and partly fear.
7.) Awe is partly fear and partly surprise.
IF FEAR IS ABSENT, OR NOT PRESENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (0)
LOW INTENSITY FEAR (score 1 or 2)
Painful Events:

"I fell down and hurt my knee."

Timidity: "Once I went to the bathroom in my pants because I was too
shy to ask to go the girls' room." "Besides, I was too afraid
of the toilet because it made so much noise when it flushed."
MEDIUM INTENSITY FEAR (score 3 or 4)
Painful Events:
punished."
Shame:

"I remember lying on my bed crying after being

"The teacher rebuked me sternly and I felt angry and upset."
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Fears: "Waking up after an operation and feeling the weight of both
casts on my legs. I was frightened."
Embarrassment: "Finally my father insisted I remove the roll from my
mouth and when I did the blood rushed down from my mouth. I
was pretty embarrassed."
Fleeing: "I remember being afraid of the waves, running away each
time one would break."
HIGH INTENSITY FEAR (score 5 or 6)
Humiliation: "I managed to fall over backwards and land on my head,
and everyone around laughted. The headache was nothing compared
to the humiliation I felt."
Terror: "When I was very small, about two, I vaguely remember my
mother hurriedly picking me up and carrying me into a closet
and turning out the light; we were both standing in pitch
darkness and I was very frightened."
Apprenehsion: "I can remember looking down under the sheets and seeing
all sorts of crazy animals and then screaming because I thought
they were going to hurt me."
Panic: "I remember being covered with wasps, and being almost
hysterical with fear."
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THE ACCEPTANCE SCALE

0
absent

1
very
slightly

2

slightly

3

fairly

4

strongly

5

very
strongly

6

extremely

Scoring Criteria
1.) Acceptance is indicated when the individual reports feelings of
acceptance, trust, agreeableness, or linking; behaviorally, when
the individual engages in affiliative, friendly actions toward
another person, or thing (e.g., caring, soothing, comforting,
hugging, grooming and physical care for another); functionally,
it is indicated by trust, and incorporation into one's life,
feeling, thought, and most fundamentally into one's body (e.g.,
eating, swallowing, etc.); in the language of traits, acceptance
and incorporation are indicated by acquisitiveness, receptivity,
cooperativeness, and at the extreme by avarice, gluttony, passive
compliance.
2.) Acceptance is often implied in interpersonal acts (make-believe
play, family outings, conjoint work, etc.) which presume, or are
psychologically predicated upon, the presence of conjointly
negotiated or established perspectives on an event or activity.
For example, in make-believe play, one person might state, "You
be the cowboy, and I'll be the Indian," with the respondent
replying, "Bang, I just shot you with my colt 45." The respondent
must have accepted the first person's basic psychological perspective upon the ensuing activities for the reply to be interpreted
and understood correctly. Joint play implies a medium level
intensity score of acceptance. Single play implies a lower level
of intensity, unless other information indicates otherwise.
3.) Common events often scoreable as acceptance refer to eating,
receiving gifts, affection, accepting favors, and by reference to
concern for other's or one's own physical, or emotional status.
4.) Acceptance is often indicated by reference to being with one's
family or friends, or by seeking group membership, or cohesiveness; in general, by reference to the desire to be "with"
people.
5.) Cooperation between persons, or sharing with others, is often
indicative of acceptance. Note, reference to specific individuals
often implies joy and acceptance.
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6.) Acceptance should be distinguished from joy by the overall
"thrust" of the experience. Acceptance involves an "inward
movement" of incorporation. Joy-gregariousness usually involves
a more "outward" oriented thrust to the experience which is aimed
at making contact with the object of the joy.
7.) Acquiescence often indicates acceptance.
8.) Feeling honored by others indicates acceptance.
9.) Stealing implies a medium level acceptance of the stolen object.
10.) Touching another implies a medium level of acceptance.
11.) Friendship implies a medium level of acceptance of the other who
is the friend, especially if friendly actions occur.
IF INCORPORATION IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (O)
LOW INTENSITY INCORPORATION (score 1 or 2)
Accepting People: "There was a fat old man who slept in the bunk above
me and who used to tell very nice stories./ " • • . my grandfather helping me put on my shoes."
Oral Intake of Food: "Whenever I went to the corner butcher shop I
would get a piece of bologna if I could spell it out."
Acceptance:

"I remember being given a puppy."

MEDIUM INTENSITY ACCEPTANCE (score 3 or 4)
Receiving Gifts: "She was very nice and brought them down to our
apartment. I felt very happy that she had brought us a present."
Liking People: "I also developed my first close relationship with a
boy my age playing cowboy and Indian games./ I wanted to be her
friend."
Incorporation: "I took the best care of it I could because it was the
first animal I could call mine."
Acquiescence: "Every morning she would kiss us and make a big fuss
about us."
Admission: "My teacher took me over to some of the other girls in
my class and that day I met one of my closest friends."
Receptivity: "I had three imaginary friends I would have long conversations with them and really believed they were real."
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HIGH INTENSITY ACCEPTANCE (score 5 or 6)
Oral Intake of Food: "My mother gave me a piece of chocolate cake.
I remember cake as the best one she ever made."
Receiving Gifts: "My grandmother called me to say a friend was at
the back door. I opened the door and saw my father, a true
friend with a brand new bike for me."
Covetousness: "As I got involved in the game, I decided I wanted
all the marbles that everyone had."
Gluttony: "The table was so full of food I remember eating and
eating until I was so stuffed that I could hardly move."
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CODED AFFECT SUMMARY SHEET
Subject no:

ER 1

ER 2

ER 3

1.) Anger

Anger

Anger

2.) Fear

Fear

Fear

3.) Surprise

Surprise

Surprise

4.) Expectancy _·_

Expectancy _·__

Expectancy _ _

5.) Disgust

Disgust

Disgust

6.) Acceptance

Acceptance

Acceptance _ _

7.) Joy

Joy

Joy

8.) Sad

Sad

Sad

ER 4

ER 5

Anger

Anger

Fear

Fear

Surprise

Surprise

Expectancy

Expectancy

Disgust

Disgust

Acceptance

Acceptance

Joy

Joy

Sad

Sad

X Affect Score
1.) Anger

9.) Sum Pas. Affect (4,5,7)

2.) Fear

10.) Sum Neg. Affect (1,2,3,5,8)

3.) Surprise

11.) Sum Affect Score (1-8)

4.) Expectancy

12.) Score 9/11 (ratio pas.)

5.) Disgust
6.) Acceptance _ _

7.) Joy

8.) Sad
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On Estimating the Variation From the Empirical Matrix of
Correlations That is Used in the Circumplex Analysis
The simple ratio of the variation of the rho-estimates divided
by the variation of the rho-estimates plus the Mean Squared Residual
(MSR) can be used to estimate the variation from the empirical matrix
which is used in the circumplex analysis. The MSR = Sum (r - rc)2
where r refers to each of the 28 empirical correlations and re refers
to each of the rho-estimates. Since the four rho-estimates are
entered into the 8 x 8 theoretical matrix given earlier in Table 3,
the latter can be used to determine which rho-estimate is subtracted
from each empirical r.
The total variation in the empirical matrix of correlations is
given by: Sum (r - r 2 ). This variance can be analytically partitioned
into two independent sources of variation each of which can be estimated by the MSR and the variance of the rho-estimates about their own
mean value. The empirical rand the Fe are equivalent since the rho's
are estimated from the empirical matrix. Therefore, the variance of
the rho's is predicted variation resulting from circumplexity in the
matrix. However, the MSR is the deviation of the empirical correlations from the rho-estimates. The MSR is, therefore, a direct function of the extent of departure between the values in the empirical
matrix and the matrix of rho-estimates. In effect it "indexes" how
well the rho-matrix fits the actual empirical correlation matrix.
With this in mind it is possible to demonstrate that the sum of
the MSR and the variance of the rho's is equal to the total variation
in the empirical matrix. The total variation in the empirical matrix
can be partitioned into two components as follows:

~(r = r) 2 = [(r - rc) - (r c - r)J 2 .
The first component on the left side of the equation is the MSR while
the second component is the variation of the rho's around the empirical mean r. The latter refers, of course, to variation created by
circumplexity in the matrix. Then:
Sum (r - r )
c

2

2

+ (r c -

r) - 2(r

Thus, the total variation in
the MSR plus the variance of
Then the ratio given earlier
ical matrix which is used in
estimates.

- r )(r c
c

r)

Sum (r - r )
c

2

the empirical matrix can be estimated by
the rho's around their own mean value.
estimates the variation from the empirthe circumplex analysis based on rho-
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